U.S. national security strategy in Southeast Asia: a reappraisal by Freeseman, Douglas D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1995-06
U.S. national security strategy in Southeast Asia: a reappraisal
Freeseman, Douglas D.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/31437
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: A REAPPRAISAL 
by 
Douglas D. Freeseman 
June 1995 
Thesis Advisor. Claude A. Buss 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
19960122 074 r/ncQUALcre 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information.   Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information, Operations, and Reports, 
1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, D.C. 20503. 
1. AGENCYUSE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORTDATE 
June 1995 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A REAPPRAISAL 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR 
FREESEMAN, DOUGLAS D. 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMINGORGANIZATION 
REPORTNUMBER 
9. STONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAME AND ADDRESS 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORTNUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRBUnON/AVAILABlLnY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
12b. DISTRBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200-words) 
The United States found itself at the end of the Cold War with a predominately military national security 
strategy that has been less relevant in coping with the residue of the bi-polar world.  Furthermore, the 
general diffusion of power in the international system from military capability towards economic might 
highlights the need for a general reappraisal of U.S. interests, objectives, and strategy.   This thesis 
begins with a definition of global U.S. national interests and then defines the specific objectives of the 
national strategy as applied to the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia.   In following chapters, it 
analyzes the security environment of Southeast Asia, the enduring and developing conflicts within the 
region and with external powers, as well as mechanisms for conflict resolution. Finally, it asks whether 
official U.S. strategy adequately promotes and protects the national interests of the United States.  It 
concludes that the current U.S. national security strategy of "engagement and enlargement" is flawed 
and must not confuse the national interests, such as the survival of the United States and its prosperity, 
or put international relationships at risk for the sake of national values, such as the promotion of 
democracy and human rights abroad.  It supports continued "engagement" as a basic strategy without 
the emphasis on "enlargement" of a particular system of values as perceived by the Americans. 
14. SUBJECTTERMS 
United States, national interests, strategy, Asia-Pacific, 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN, multilateralism 
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
133 
16. PRICE CODE 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 
CATION OF REPORT 
Unclassified 
18. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 
CATION OF THSPAGE 
Unclassified 
19. SECURITY CLASSIFI- 
CATION OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified 
20. LIMITATIONOF ABSTRACT 
UL 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
298-102 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
A REAPPRAISAL 
Douglas D. Freeseman 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., University of Kansas, 1982 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
from the 




Claude A. Buss, Theses Advisor 
James J. Wirtz,^Second Readei 
Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman 




The United States found itself at the end of the Cold War with a predominately 
military national security strategy that has been less relevant in coping with the residue of 
the bi-polar world. Furthermore, the general diffusion of power in the international 
system from military capability towards economic might highlights the need for a general 
reappraisal of U.S. interests, objectives, and strategy. This thesis begins with a definition 
of global U.S. national interests and then defines the specific objectives of the national 
strategy as applied to the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia. In following chapters, 
it analyzes the security environment of Southeast Asia, the enduring and developing 
conflicts within the region and with external powers, as well as mechanisms for conflict 
resolution. Finally, it asks whether official U.S. strategy adequately promotes and 
protects the national interests of the United States. It concludes that the current U.S. 
national security strategy of "engagement and enlargement" is flawed and must not 
confuse the national interests, such as the survival of the United States and its prosperity, 
or put international relationships at risk for the sake of national values, such as the 
promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. It supports continued "engagement" 
as a basic strategy without the emphasis on "enlargement" of a particular system of 
values as perceived by the Americans. Accesion For 
NTIS    CRA&I 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN ASIA 5 
A. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS 6 
B. "ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT" AS CURRENT STRATEGY.... 9 
C. "ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 13 
IE.  CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: INTERNAL 21 
A. ENDURING ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS .. 22 
B. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 28 
C. THE END OF THE COLD WAR 31 
D. MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES 38 
E. TRADE, MARKETS, AND INVESTMENT 44 
F. THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ARMS BUILDUP: A NEW PHENOMENON .. 45 
IV. CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: EXTERNAL 63 
A. THEIR NEAR NEIGHBORS 63 
B. PERCEPTIONS OF MORE DISTANT POWERS 69 
C. THEUNTTED STATES 72 
V. EXISTING STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 81 
A. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS 81 
B. MULTILATERAL STRATEGIES 83 
VI. US.~NATIONAL STRATEGY: TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 109 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117 




Southeast Asia1 is a diverse region made up often states. All but one, Laos, are 
coastal states with significant maritime interests. They are all developing states with 
different land areas, coastlines, populations, degrees of ethnic and religious diversity, 
levels of industrialization, and economic prosperity. The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) have all pursued export-oriented development and therefore have very 
competitive economies within the region. They compete for external capital and jobs 
based on labor costs and productivity and for markets overseas. Continued development 
requires peace and stability in the region and a secure maritime trade for import and 
export of raw materials and products. The Indochina states, embroiled in conflict for 
most of the Cold War, are only now opening their economies to the outside. Burma's 
repressive regime continues to keep that nation isolated from the rest of Southeast Asia. 
In spite of this competition, one of the primary success stories of Southeast Asia 
has been the formal and informal relationships that have developed beginning with 
economic cooperation that may provide a model for future security cooperation. To 
understand Southeast Asia, it is important to remember its position as a sub-region within 
the greater Asia-Pacific.2 
Southeast Asia consists of: the six current members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations or ASEAN(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore); the 
three Indochina states (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam); and Burma 
2
 The Asia-Pacific region consists of: East Asia (Japan, the Korean peninsula, the People's 
Republic of China, Russia, and Taiwan), Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific.  Used here, the 
1 
Southeast Asia spent most of the Cold War split into roughly non-communist and 
communist camps each with its superpower patron. The non-communist states came 
together in ASEAN. ASEAN was formed in August 1967 with the announcement of the 
"Bangkok Declaration" by the original five members: Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Singapore. Its formation came soon after Indonesia and the Philippines 
finally extended recognition to the Federation of Malaysia and the end of direct 
confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia that had been going on since 1963. 
According to the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was established "to accelerate 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region... to promote 
regional peace and stability... [and] to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance 
on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and 
administrative fields."3 While the ASEAN members have determined that it is in their 
national interest to cooperate on many areas of common interest, they have concentrated 
on economic cooperation. According to Norman Palmer, the framers of ASEAN 
"insisted that the new organization would not deal directly with security matters and 
would also avoid controversial political issues. This stated aversion to formal 
involvement with problems of security and defense and delicate political issues is 
greater Asia-Pacific includes this diverse region as well as the interests of Australia and New 
Zealand, Canada, India, Russia, and the United States. 
3
 From the text of the Bangkok Declaration in Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South- 
EastAsia (London: Rouüedge, 1989), 161. 
characteristic of almost all the regional organizations in Asia and the Pacific."4 It has 
only been the combination of almost three decades of cooperation and the end of the 
Cold War that has transformed a dialogue, traditionally concentrated on economic issues, 
towards security concerns. 
The communist camp, roughly consisting of the Indochina states, spent most of 
the Cold War in bloody, ideological conflict, isolated from the rest of Southeast Asia. At 
the end of the Cold War, these states were emerging from the third Indochina conflict 
following the Paris Agreement of 1991 and the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops 
from Cambodia. They have a long way to go to catch up with the rest of Southeast Asia 
both economically and as full members of the regional family. 
While all of Southeast Asia felt the grip of Cold-War internal insurgencies, the 
Cold War in Southeast Asia was fought primarily in Indochina. With the exception of 
the first Indochina conflict, which involved the French, Indochina was the nexus where 
Chinese, Soviet, and U.S. interests met. This kept the focus of ASEAN on the 
continental balance of power in Southeast Asia between Thailand backed by the United 
States and Vietnam supported by China and the Soviet Union. 
With the end of the Cold War, the bi-polar world has given way to a new 
arrangement of great power relationships. The end of the Cold War has also brought to 
an end the ideological phase of the conflict in Indochina. This fundamental change in the 
security environment of Southeast Asia explains the need for a re-examination of the 
4Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Lexington Books, 1991), 65. 
security strategies which have been pursued in Southeast Asia for the last four decades by 
the United States. 
It is imperative to ask whether the national security strategy of the United States 
has kept up with the changes that have taken place in the international system and 
whether it adequately promotes and protects the national interests of the United States. 
To answer this question, Chapter II of this thesis begins with a definition of global U.S. 
national interests and then defines those specific objectives of the national security 
strategy as applied to the Asia-Pacific region. In Chapter m, conflicts of interest in the 
region are examined. In Chapter IV, the interests of extra-regional states with Southeast 
Asia are explored. Chapter V examines the role of conflict resolution in Southeast Asia 
and the future of new multilateral initiatives. In the conclusion, U.S. national security 
strategy is assessed in terms of its ability to cope with developments in the region. 
II. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN ASIA 
Samuel P. Huntington has broadly defined national strategy as "the development 
and use of the entire range of resources (political, economic, military, or some 
combination) by a government to achieve its objectives against the opposition of another 
government or group."5 An integral part of this definition is that strategy cannot be 
defined in a vacuum, it must be formulated in response to a threat. This threat-driven 
definition, however, is not very useful in developing a comprehensive national strategy 
in the current international environment. Without the overarching bi-polar threat, a 
looser, goal-driven or uncertainty based, definition of strategy must be used. 
A goal driven strategy refers to the national policy of a government that promotes 
its security objectives. Such a strategy began with NSC-68, the watershed document that 
was the foundation of the Cold-War policy of containment. NSC-68 was more than just a 
military strategy, it was a "broad concept of national strategy involving economics, 
politics, military policy, and psychological warfare."6 Since that time, the national 
security strategy of the United States has cycled between this broad focus and a strategy 
with a predominant military emphasis. 
5
 Samuel P. Huntington, "The evolution of U.S. National Strategy," in Daniel J. Kaufman, David 
S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan, eds., U.S. National Strategy for the 1990s (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 12. 
6
 Ibid., 13. 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States was left with a military strategy that 
had produced the 1980s military buildup driven by then President Reagan and had served 
as a guiding light until the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. This military strategy was a response to the Soviet threat and was less relevant in 
coping with the residue of the bi-polar world. Furthermore, the general diffusion of 
power in the international system from military capability towards economic might 
highlights the need for a general reappraisal of U.S. interests, objectives, and strategies. 
A.       U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS 
The most basic and enduring statement of U.S. national interests is the preamble 
to the Constitution of the United States: 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our Prosterity, do ordain and establish this 
CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.7 
This statement of the long term asperational goals of the United States has withstood the 
test of time. Remaining as true today as when it was written during the early years of the 
nation. The national interests articulated are: 
• The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation; 
• Protection of fundamental U.S. values, institutions, and people; 
• National unity; and 
• Domestic security, stability, and prosperity. 
7
 The Constitution of the United States. 
While these interests have been articulated in different ways and priorities have changed 
between a domestic and international focus on the one hand and primarily military and 
economic on the other, they have endured. 
The Constitution gives the President primary responsibility for executing U.S. 
foreign policy, yet the founding fathers believed that the Legislative Branch should be 
supreme in its formulation.   Foreign policy was largely driven by Congress up until 
World War II. After that war, power shifted to the Executive Branch where it remained 
until the Vietnam War. The end of the war in Vietnam and the War Powers Act of 1975 
cast doubts on Presidential control over foreign policy.   Since that time, Congress has 
been slowly seeking to reclaim its traditional role by limiting Presidential power. 
President Reagan called this tendency detrimental. For the Congress to act 
in a directive manner with regard to details of foreign, defense, and arms 
control policy, [limits] the flexibility of the Executive Branch by enacting 
into law positions on which the President should be allowed reasonable 
discretion. This trend diminishes our ability to conduct rational and 
coherent policies on the world scene; reduces our leverage in critical 
negotiations; and impedes the integrated use of U.S. power to achieve 
important national security objectives. It causes others to view us as 
unreliable, and diminishes our influence generally.8 
There has been a consistent theme from the Executive Branch that there must be 
participation by the Congress but there must also be Presidential leadership.    The 
advantage of the Executive Branch being that regardless of the range of diverse opinion 
and the level of debate within the administration, the President speaks with authority 
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, January 1988), 40-41. 
once policy decisions are made. This post Vietnam trend towards greater Congressional 
involvement in foreign policy is acknowledged, but so is a related trend towards retaining 
the position of the President as the leader in defining the national interest and directing 
security strategies. 
The President is required to issue a report on U.S. national security strategy in 
accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department 
Reorganization Act of 1986. Beginning with the first report by President Reagan in 
January 1987, these reports have followed roughly annually through the Bush 
administration to the current strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement," issued in 
February 1995 by President Clinton. 
These reports give a clear articulation of what the current administration 
perceives as the national interests, priorities, objectives, and strategy in support of those 
interests. U.S. national interests throughout this period can be summarized as: 
• The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation; 
• The protection of fundamental U.S. values, institutions, and people; 
• Domestic prosperity; and 
• The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free market economies 
throughout the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system. 
A comparison of these contemporary national interests to those stated by the 
founding fathers shows remarkable consistency. The most obvious difference being that 
while the preamble to the Constitution, written shortly after the war for independence, 
concentrates on the preservation of independence, national unity, and domestic prosperity 
8 
and shows little concern for international affairs; contemporary U.S. national interests, 
while just as concerned with those enduring interests, looks outward with a strategy of 
"engagement and enlargement." This international flavor is expected due to the growing 
economic interdependence of nations as expressed in foreign trade and investment. 
These "new" interests are: 
• Environmentally sound economic growth throughout the world; and 
• Access to a fair and open international trading system. 
In addition to these interests, a third set of "interests" has emerged. These have 
slowly risen in priority with the relative loss of the threat to the survival of the United 
States. Now incorporated into President Clinton's strategy of "enlargement," this third 
set includes: 
• Enlarging the community of market democracies; and 
• Promoting respect for human rights. 
B.       "ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT" AS CURRENT STRATEGY 
According to President Clinton, the primary objectives of U.S. national security 
strategy and the national interests they support are: 
• To enhance U.S. security by maintaining a strong defense capability and 
promoting cooperative security measures; 
- the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation; 
- the protection of fundamental U.S. values, institutions, and people; 
- cooperative security relationships with friends and allies; and 
- domestic prosperity. 
.    To promote prosperity at home by working to open foreign markets and spur 
global economic growth; 
- environmentally sound economic growth throughout the world; and 
- access to a fair and open international trading system. 
•    To promote democracy abroad.9 
- enlarging the community of market democracies; and 
- promoting the respect for human rights and the environment. 
This is a strategy of "engagement and enlargement" which draws upon the full range of 
political, military, and economic instruments. 
The strategy of engagement is the security incarnation of U.S. foreign policy and 
corresponds to the first two objectives of security and prosperity while the strategy of 
enlargement applies to the third objective which has elements of human rights in addition 
to democratization. These objectives cannot be achieved without U.S. leadership.10 
These three central objectives of current national security strategy-security, 
prosperity, and democracy-are not new; they are merely restatements of the overarching 
foreign policy objectives of "stability, democracy, and access."11 President Bush called 
for "security, democracy, and trade" in the 1990s and his Secretary of State James Baker 
wrote that "the Pacific community needs to be founded on three pillars. 
First...framework  for   economic   integration.      Second...foster   the   trend  towards 
The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), 3-7. 
President Clinton writes that while "we are not the world's policeman,... as the world's premier 
economic and military power, and with the strength of our democratic values, the U.S. is 
indispensable to the forging of stable political relations and open trade. See Ibid., 7. 
"Charles H. Stevenson, "U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Implications for Current 
Regional Issues," Contemporary Southeast Asia. 14, no. 2 (September 1992), 98. 
10 
democratization. Third...define a renewed defense structure...a prerequisite to 
maintaining stability."12 
These three objectives have been the foundation of U.S. foreign policy since the 
mid-1980s but do they support the national interests? Traditional interests have evolved 
to include this third objective that the President now calls enlargement, a broad term 
defined to include democratization and human rights, but are these vital national 
interests? 
Charles H. Stevenson writes that these three objectives form a conceptual circle, 
with each serving as both a means and an end: 
Democracy...conceives stability; stability...invites investment, trade, and 
inevitably prosperity; prosperity in turn strengthens democratic 
institutions. It is a circular model of complimentary means and ends 
which is ideal for public consumption but poorly suited to the exigencies 
of the international system.13 
This same argument is put forward in support of the President's national security strategy 
in the East Asia Strategy Report of February 1995: 
United States interests in the region are mutually reinforcing: security is 
necessary for economic growth, security and growth make it more likely 
that human rights will be honored and democracy will emerge, and 
democratization makes international conflict less likely because 
democracies are unlikely to fight one another.14 
12
 Ibid., 98. 
13
 Ibid., 98-9. 
14
 Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), 3. 
11 
The strategy of engagement and enlargement is a principled strategy of selective 
engagement. It is principled in that it is not only based on vital national interests but also 
on U.S. national values. It is selective by setting priorities and limits to action only in 
those areas where U.S. interests are engaged. 
This strategy may be viewed as inconsistent by foreign governments because the 
U.S. may not always act in similar "moral" circumstances where higher priority interests 
are not threatened. This strategy is also more difficult to develop because in addition to 
defining national interests and priorities, there is an equally difficult task of defining 
national values and to prioritize these "moral" interests relative to traditional security and 
economic interests. 
A principled strategy will often find itself in conflict. The United States, in fact, 
has shown little regard for democracy as an enduring national interest. When U.S. 
security and prosperity are threatened, the ideals embodied by enlargement always take 
second place. This was especially true during the Cold War, but is just as true today. 
Other examples of principles in conflict include: 
• National   self-determination   versus   the   inviolability   of   internationally 
- recognized borders; 
• The right to refuge versus protection from excessive immigration; and 
• The protection of human rights versus non-intervention in internal affairs.15 
Thus, irrespective of official statements, Stevenson concludes that: 
15Patrick Clawson, ed., Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 10. 
12 
democratization should not be considered by Southeast Asian leaders as a 
well constructed, reliable objective by which to predict U.S. behavior in 
the region. Stability, trade and investment access are likely to remain 
overarching objectives of the United States, similar to the ones which 
predominated during the cold war and before. 
He goes on to say that: 
no small country can realistically expect the United States to come to its 
rescue if the situation does not immediately threaten its three perceived 
vital interests [stability, trade, and access].16 
Therefore, the third objective of the Presidents strategy is not built upon the national 
interests. Instead, it is built upon national values. When these values are found not to be 
compatible with those of a friend, ally, or adversary, an intellectual argument will not be 
sufficient to alter their view. In that case, is the United States prepared to sacrifice other 
national interests such as security and prosperity to promote democracy or human rights? 
If not, what strategy should the United States pursue? 
C.  "ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
President Clinton, in a 1993 speech before the Korean National Assembly in 
Seoul, expressed his desire for: 
a New Pacific Community built on shared strength, shared prosperity, and 
a shared commitment to democratic values. 
He went on to say that: 
16
 Stevenson, "U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia," 99-100. 
17
 Clinton, Bill, "Speech delivered to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, Korea, 10 July 
1993," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 19, no. 28 (19 July 1993), 1310- 
1314. 
13 
the United States intends to remain actively engaged in this region. 
America is, after all, a Pacific Nation.... We have fought three wars here 
in this century. We must not squander that investment. The best way for 
us to deter regional aggression, perpetuate the region's robust economic 
growth, and secure our own maritime and other interests is an active 
presence in the region.18 
This vision of a New Pacific Community which links security requirements with 
economic realities and concern for democracy and human rights has developed into the 
regional Asia-Pacific strategy in support of engagement and enlargement.  This strategy 
is based on the same three objectives of security, prosperity, and democracy. 
1.        Enhancing Our Security 
The first objective of a new Pacific community, security, is met primarily through 
diplomacy. This may take on a broad range of political, economic, arid military options. 
The United States must take a leadership position, but will work through existing alliance 
networks; at the same time, promoting the development of effective cooperative and 
multilateral solutions to regional disputes. While U.S. security commitments are 
currently grounded primarily in a network of bilateral relationships, the United States is 
committed to working within the indigenous multilateral arrangements being formed. 
These arrangements, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), can enhance regional 
security through dialogue and transparency. 
The United States must maintain a strong defense. The February 1995 National 
Military Strategy, issued with the latest national security strategy, provides the military 
18Ibid., 1310-1314. 
14 
options available to meet this objective and is based on the ability to fight two nearly 
simultaneous major regional conflicts. 
Our willingness and ability to play a leading role in defending common 
interests also help ensure that the United States will remain an influential 
voice in international affairs - political, military, and economic - that 
affect our well being, so long as we retain the military wherewithal to 
underwrite our commitments credibly.19 
Integral to a strong defense, overseas presence includes forward deployment of forces 
and pre-positioning of war-fighting material during peacetime as well as regular 
deployments, multilateral military exercises, and other military-to-military contacts. 
Overseas presence provides the following benefits: 
• Gives form and substance to bilateral and multilateral security commitments; 
• Demonstrates determination to defend U.S. and allied interests in critical 
regions; 
• Provides forward elements for rapid response in crises as well as the bases, 
ports and other infrastructure essential for deployment of U.S.-based forces by 
air, sea, and land; 
• Enhances the effectiveness of coalition operations by enhancing 
interoperability; 
.    Allows the United States to use its position of trust to prevent the 
_ development   of power   vacuums   and   dangerous   arms   races,   thereby 
underwriting regional stability by precluding threats to regional security; 
• Facilitates regional integration; and 
• Promotes an international security environment of trust, cooperation, peace, 
and stability, which is fundamental to the vitality of developing democracies 
19 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (February 
1995), 8. 
15 
and free market economies.20 
Another key element of U.S. commitment to the region is the long term priority of 
the United States in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
including terror weapons such as chemical and biological weapons, and their delivery 
systems. This is of great concern to the Asia-Pacific region as a whole and has 
culminated in the October 1994 framework agreement with North Korea for stopping, 
and eventually eliminating its nuclear weapons program. Southeast Asia has been spared 
the deleterious political, military, and economic effects of both proliferation and non- 
proliferation efforts. There is no reason to believe this will change in the near term. 
Arms control can help promote regional stability by reducing the danger of the 
security dilemma and establishing a transparent and verifiable regional balance of power. 
This objective is pertinent to Southeast Asia, a region of sustained peacetime military 
buildup while most of the world is reducing military expenditures. 
2.        Promoting Prosperity at Home 
In an interdependent world, domestic prosperity requires engagement abroad. 
Nowhere is this more important then in the Asia-Pacific region which now accounts for a 
larger proportion of U.S. trade than Europe. 
Today, the 18 member states of APEC [the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation] - comprising about one-third of the world's population -- 
produce $14 trillion and export $1.7 trillion of goods annually, about one- 
half of the world's totals. U.S. exports to APEC economies reached $300 
billion last year, supporting nearly 2.6 million American jobs. U.S. 
investments in the region totaled over $140 million - about one-third of 
20
 Ibid., 9-10. 
16 
total U.S. direct foreign investment. A prosperous and open Asia Pacific 
is key to the economic health of the United States.21 
While the U.S. is not abandoning its commitment to Europe, this means that U.S. 
interests in Asia will require more attention in the future. 
The President's strategy places emphasis on enhancing bilateral relationships 
such as the relationship with Japan while engaging the new multilateral initiatives in the 
Asia-Pacific, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and ensuring 
commitment to fulfilling the agreements included within the Uruguay round of the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded in December 1993. 
3.        Promoting Democracy 
Drawing strength from the rapid growth of nations during the past decade, the 
President put forward a strategy of enlargement which is based on two elements.   The 
first element of this strategy is 
to work with the other democracies of the world and to improve our 
cooperation with them on security and economic issues.... We must be 
willing to take immediate public positions to help staunch democratic 
reversals.... We must give democratic nations the fullest benefits of 
integration into foreign markets.... And we must help these nations 
strengthen the pillars of civil society.22 
The second element is to guarantee basic human rights throughout the world.  The U.S. 
will continue to pursue human rights on a bilateral basis while promoting international 
initiatives through the United Nations. 
21
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The current national security strategy defines democracy and human rights as 
"universal yearnings and universal norms"23 and has promoted these to the level of 
national interests. "Enlargement" is more than a strategy of passive support. It is a 
strategy that desires to enlarge the community of market democracies and to consolidate 
and expand democratic reforms. These two elements, however, are an expression of U.S. 
national values. As values, they should not be confused with the national interests. 
While the United States is right to promote them abroad, it should be willing to accept 
whatever form of government and/or value system a nation chooses for itself and not 
demand a U.S. style liberal democracy as the only solution or to accept the U.S. focus on 
individual freedoms as the framework for defining human rights. 
The strategy of "enlargement" and the values underlying it, are strongly objected 
to, almost uniformly, in Southeast Asia. This objection is especially strong whenever 
there are attempts to link "good governance" to relations with the United States, 
especially economic relations. U.S. pressure will, in all likelihood, increase the 
resistance of local governments and in the long run reduce the influence the United 
States has in the region. This could also push Southeast Asia into closer ties with the 
emerging powers of India and China or towards Japan. 
Ultimately, the observance of democracy and human rights will succeed of fail 
due to the results of local solutions and domestic support and not through outside 
pressure.  U.S. economic assistance to these developing countries and regional security 
23
 Ibid., 29. 
18 
assistance through a strong U.S. commitment and regional presence will help provide the 
fertile ground, a strong middle class, for indigenous democratic reforms and human 
rights initiatives. 
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III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: INTERNAL 
In the years following World War n, Southeast Asia was a region of nascent 
states emerging from their colonial past. For most of the Cold War, they concentrated on 
the process of nation-building and struggled with internal problems and threats to 
legitimacy. These threats have largely been overcome but the racial, ethnic, and religious 
diversity that caused them is still present. These countries also have been concentrating 
on economic development and striving to raise the standard of living of their people. 
This chapter turns to the application of interests and strategies as currently stated 
to those unresolved conflicts in Southeast Asia. With internal stability and relative 
prosperity achieved during the very recent past, the states that makeup Southeast Asia 
have begun to reopen many territorial and sovereignty disputes that have been set aside 
for many years. While none of these threaten to develop into armed conflict, they may 
spoil otherwise good relations. These conflicts have been divided into five broad areas: 
ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts; territorial disputes; legacies of the Cold War; 
maritime boundary and sovereignty disputes; and the economic issues of trade, markets, 
and investment. These conflicts introduce a degree of uncertainty into an already volatile 
region. The implications of a regional arms buildup in Southeast Asia will also be 
discussed. 
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A.       ENDURING ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS 
In Southeast Asia there is a strong norm towards non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states. This norm has been formalized in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
and has been repeated in many other forums. Ethnic, religious, and ideological disputes 
are primarily an internal concern of a state and its people. In the context of Southeast 
Asia, where national and religious lines cross state boundaries, there is always the danger 
of these internal disputes developing an international dimension. These transnational 
disputes include the external support of insurgencies or the flow of political and 
economic refugees to neighboring states in response to internal strife. Furthermore, rapid 
economic development has expanded environmental problems to this region and the 
AIDs epidemic threatens its future economic prosperity. Attention will be directed to the 
following conflicts: 
• Communist and Muslim Insurgents in the Philippines; 
• The strong separatist movement in Sabah; 
• Malaysian Internal Security; 
• Muslim separatists in southern Thailand; 
• The Shan, Kachin, and Karen secessionist, communist insurgent, and pro- 
democracy rebellions in Burma; 
• The continuing resistance to Indonesian rule in East Timor; 
.    The  Organisasi  Papua Merdeka  (OPM)  resistance  movement  in  West 
Irian/Irian Jaya; and 
• The Aceh independence movement in northern Sumatra. 
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The Philippines of all the ASEAN members has the most serious problem with 
continuing challenges to the government from the communists in the north to Muslim 
extremists in the south. There are four main insurgent organizations in the Philippines: 
the NPA and the communist National Democratic Front (NDF); and two Muslim 
organizations the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the breakaway Muslim 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), centered on the southern island of Mindanao. The 
Philippine government has been negotiating with both the NDF and the MNLF but 
negotiations have been threatened by factionalism in both cases. Further complicating 
this issue is the implication of Malaysia in the Moro struggle in Mindanao to include 
supplying the Muslim rebels with military supplies and providing sanctuary for the Moro 
fighters in the neighboring Malaysian state of Sabah. The Malaysian government has 
never publicly admitted its involvement in the Moro Struggle; however, Samad and 
Bakar argue that Malaysian assistance "gave the essential incentive to the Moro 
separatists."24 This support from Sabah and other Malaysian Muslim sectors has allowed 
the Moros to expand their fight for equality and justice into a war of liberation, 
demanding self-determination. 
This Malaysian involvement in the conflict in Mindanao not only increases the 
tension between the two states, but is a source of internal conflict in Malaysia as well. In 
the neighboring state of Sabah, the predominantly non-Muslim Kadazans fear that the 
24Paridah Abd. Samad and Darusalam Abu Bakar, "Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue of 
Sabah," Asian Survey 32, no. 6 (June 1992), 560. 
23 
influx of Moros will jeopardize their political and cultural status. They believe the 
tolerance shown to the Moros by the Malaysian central government to be part of a policy 
aimed at restructuring the communal balance in Malaysia.25 
In Malaysia, the challenge is from the north Borneo state of Sabah. Since Sabah's 
incorporation into the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, there has been a continuing shift 
of power from the state to the central government in Kuala Lumpur. The increasingly 
alienated population of Sabah, resentful of this shift, has become more active in their 
political opposition. 
Since the 1990 federal election, there has been near open warfare between 
Malaysia's prime minister and the state government of Sabah, which, with its 
predominately non-Malay constituency, had run on a platform promising to re-negotiate 
federal-state relations, with the aim of restoring those attributes of self-government lost 
to Kuala Lumpur, thereby gaining greater administrative and economic autonomy for the 
state.26 The 1995 federal election, while giving the ruling National Front coalition and 
Prime Minister Mahathir personally the strongest mandate that they have had since 
independence, did not fundamentally alter this opposition in Sabah. 
The Sabah government desires control over the flow of immigrants into the state, 
particularly those from the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, who now number up 
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to half a million, out of a total Sabah population of about a million and a half. These, 
predominately Muslim, immigrants threaten to upset the traditional racial mix of Sabah 
and the federal policy of naturalizing these immigrants also threatens to produce a 
Malay-Muslim political dominance. Other demands include wider opportunity for the 
local population in government and the civil service, a greater say and share in the 
resource wealth extracted from Sabah, local control of the media, education, and a 
review of the constitutional safeguards granted Sabah on its entry into the federation as 
embodied in what are known as the "20 points." These 20 points, which outline the 
special rights of the people of Sabah, were never incorporated in or protected by the 
constitution and have been eroded by the central government over the last thirty years.27 
The central government's uncompromising position on Sabah only hardens the 
resolve of those in Sabah who push for a re-evaluation of state-federal relations and the 
extremists who go further to push for succession. While it would be difficult for the 
federal government to give in to these demands, a more compromising position such as 
open dialogue on the less difficult concerns is needed. This could include dialogue on 
immigration policy and further autonomy over local affairs. 
While a difficult internal problem for Malaysia, the flow of refugees and illegal 
immigrants from the Philippines to the state of Sabah is an irritant in an already difficult 
bilateral relationship. 
The movement of Filipino refugees to Sabah began just after the 
declaration of martial law in the Philippines and the outbreak of the 
27
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secessionist movement spearheaded by the Moro National Liberation 
Front. The migration reached its peak at the height of the secessionist 
problem in 1974-75. Immediately following the signing of the Tripoli 
Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF in 1976, 
Muslim entry to Sabah decreased relatively. However, another wave of 
Filipino immigrants arrived in Sabah in 1980, largely in search of trading 
and job opportunities as a result of the declining economic performance in 
the Philippines. 
In addition to this separatist movement in Sabah, Malaysia has two other internal 
security concerns, which are presently contained but could erupt in the future. The first, 
the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM), which threatened the central government for 
the first two decades of independence, has lost much of its power and influence. This is 
due to emergency government measures taken in the 1960s and 70s as well as current 
economic prosperity.   It has also been assisted by the general collapse of worldwide 
-communist movements, discredited by the demise of the Soviet Union. A second issue is 
the delicate racial and religious balance between the indigenous Malay-Muslim majority 
and the Chinese and Indian minority.   This balancing act has been going on since the 
formation  of Malaysia and was  responsible  for the  original  inclusion  of the 
predominately non-Chinese Borneo states to balance the inclusion of predominately 
Chinese Singapore and subsequent expulsion of Singapore. It has also expressed itself in 
riot following the 1969 elections which resulted in three years of military rule.   Since 
independence, there has been a slow but steady consolidation of constitutional and 
institutional power by the Malay majority but the problem remains and could erupt again. 
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In Thailand, Muslim separatists have been largely neutralized by greater security 
cooperation between the governments of Malaysia and Thailand. This movement was 
primarily a result of the racial and religious differences between the Muslim population 
near the Malaysian border and the rest of Thailand. Thai government sensitivity to their 
unique position has resolved many of their demands. 
Indonesia continues to experience resistance to Indonesian rule in East Timor, 
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) resistance in West Irian/Irian Jaya, and the Aceh 
independence movement in northern Sumatra. These resistance groups, however, offer 
little threat to the central government due to their remote locations. 
Probably the most serious challenge to the state that exists in Southeast Asia, 
other than in Cambodia, is taking place in Burma. This challenge comes from Shan, 
Kachin, and Karen secessionist; communist insurgent; and pro-democracy rebellions. 
The highly fragmented nature of Burma's ethnic composition makes it difficult for the 
central government to achieve control over the outlying regions, especially in the 
northeast near the Chinese-Thai border. This same fragmentation, however, also 
prevents these various insurgent groups from coining together to challenge the central 
government and an uneasy stalemate is achieved. This situation is unstable and will not 
easily be resolved but primarily poses a land based threat to Thailand due to drug 
trafficking, the flow of refugees, and border incursions 
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B.       TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
Within Southeast Asia, there are historical boundary disputes that are a legacy of 
colonialism such as between Indonesia and Malaysia or the Philippines and Malaysia 
over the status of Sabah, and there are contemporary disputes over claims resulting from 
the evolution of the law of the sea and its affect on the jurisdiction of coastal states. This 
section discusses those land based disputes dating to colonial division while maritime 
issues will be discussed later in this chapter. The more aggravating territorial disputes 
include those which follow: 
• The continuing claim of the Philippines to the Malaysian state of Sabah and 
its adjacent waters; 
• Border dispute between Malaysia and Thailand; 
• Border conflicts between Burma and Thailand; 
• Border disputes between China and Vietnam; and 
• Border disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam. 
Once considered the most dangerous bilateral dispute within ASEAN, the 
Philippine claim to the Malaysian state of Sabah, while not resolved, has been set aside 
in recent years. The northern Borneo state of Sabah, a legacy of British colonialism, was 
incorporated into the Federation of Malaysia at its formation on 16 September 1963. The 
official Philippine claim over Sabah goes back as far to the administration of President 
Diosdado Macapagal who initiated the claim in June 1962 just prior to its incorporation. 
[This] claim was relegated to the sidelines when it became entangled 
within the wider context of the Republic of Indonesia's 'confrontation' 
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with Malaysia and the Sukarno regime's threats to resort to military means 
to crush the fledgling nation.29 
A bilateral attempt to resolve this issue was made in Bangkok following the 
confrontation but was unsuccessful. The Philippine government refused to recognize the 
new Federation of Malaysia until President Ferdinand Marcos took power in 1966. After 
the formation of ASEAN in 1967, there was a tacit agreement to shelve the issue in the 
interest of greater regional solidarity. This resulted in a softening of tensions but there 
was no resolution and a deterioration of bilateral ties led to a rupture of relations in 1969. 
The Philippine's institutionalization of the claim through enactment of 
Republic Act 5546 incorporating Sabah as part of the territory of the 
Philippines triggered Malaysian suspension of diplomatic ties.30 
Relations were again restored on 16 December 1969 during ASEAN's third ministerial 
conference. 
While Malaysia and the Philippines had originally agreed to resolve this dispute 
within the context of ASEAN, the conflict was never tabled because of the fear that such 
a potentially derisive issue could be damaging to the developing regional body and the 
issue has remained bilateral. 
Prior to the 1976 ASEAN summit meeting, President Marcos made a dramatic 
move toward normalization of bilateral relations. He stated that "the Philippines no 
longer intended to press its claim to sovereignty over Sabah."31   This statement was not 
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followed by any action and the dispute was passed to the Aquino administration where an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to amend Republic Act 5546 and 3046 to exclude Sabah 
from Philippine territory; this denied Mrs. Aquino a diplomatic victory at the ASEAN 
summit in December 1987. This dispute has remained unresolved, but relations have 
improved in recent years to include a high level visit to the Philippines by Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir in February 1994. 
This pattern of conflict resolution, concentrating on bilateral resolution while 
using the larger regional organization as diplomatic sounding board, will be seen to be 
the model of Southeast Asian relations since the end of World War II and has not 
substantively changed with the end of the Cold War and the expansion of multilateral 
initiatives for conflict resolution. 
Thailand has long standing border disputes with her regional neighbors dating 
back to the colonial era. While never a colony, the Thai diplomatic ability to play one 
colonial off another may have insured a degree of freedom of action but resulted in a loss 
of territory to what later became Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia. These 
contested territories were returned to Thailand by treaty with the Japanese in 1942, but by 
revoking this treaty following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Thailand again lost these 
territories to her neighbors. This planted the seeds of future conflict and border disputes 
that continue today. This context is not helped by a long term problem of the Thai 
central government in Bangkok not having positive control over the military and civil 
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authorities in the outlying provinces where local authorities on both sides of the border 
are not fully responsive to central control. 
The border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia has recently taken a step 
forward with the formation of the Cambodian-Thai Border Coordination Office. This 
office, in contrast with the previous border committee, will have the authority to make 
decisions without prior government approval. This formation parallels the creation of a 
joint border committee in 1989 to discuss problems along the Burmese-Thai border. 
Thailand and Malaysia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 21 
July 1977 that laid down the boundary between the two countries. As recently as 15 
February 1993, a border incident reopened this dispute, with the Thai government 
claiming to have never endorsed the MOU.32 
Vietnam has unresolved border disputes  with Cambodia and China and 
negotiations have begun with China over their 1000 mile undemarcated land border. 
C.       THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
In spite of the end of the Cold War, very serious conflicts still remain in Southeast 
Asia. These include: 
• Residual conflict in Cambodia; 
• Accounting for U.S. MIAs in Vietnam; 
• Continued fighting between government and resistance forces in Laos; 
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.    Residual communist guerrilla operations along the Thai-Lao border in 
northeast Thailand; and 
•    The Regional Shift from a Continental Towards a Maritime Focus. 
With the end of the Cold War, Indochina, which has been embroiled in conflict 
almost continuously since World War n, is finding peace. On 23 October 1991, the Paris 
International Conference on Cambodia adopted the Agreements on a Comprehensive 
Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict. These agreements were designed to 
bring peace to a region that had not known peace in decades. The United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was created and would become the largest 
and most expensive UN peacekeeping effort to date. 
Cambodia had been under the brutal Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-78 until 
Vietnamese intervention following atrocities in which millions of Cambodians were 
killed. The Vietnamese sponsored government that resulted was then replaced by a 
provisional government as part of the UN brokered peace between competing factions in 
Cambodia including the Khmer Rouge until popular elections could be held. 
UNTAC was a qualified success in that elections were held with an estimated 85 
percent turnout in spite of Khmer Rouge threats of interference. UNTAC, however, took 
almost a year to deploy which delayed these elections and was not successful in 
disarming the various factions, particularly the Khmer Rouge which continue to 
challenge the government today. Since the elections, the Parliament has outlawed the 
Khmer Rouge; but, it is estimated that they still control about 10 percent of Cambodia 
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with about 9000 men.33  This continued Khmer Rouge resistance and allegations of Thai 
support along the border has continued to sour Thai-Cambodian relations. 
Vietnam, extracting itself from the third Indochina conflict, has withdrawn all 
troops from Cambodia in response to this UN brokered peace. While still devoutly 
socialist, Vietnam has been dramatically moving towards greater popular participation in 
government and towards a market economy consistent with her regional neighbors. 
During the third Indochina conflict, the ASEAN member states were aligned 
against Vietnam. Today, devastated by years of war and the loss of aid and assistance 
from her former superpower patron, the Soviet Union, Vietnam sees her future in the 
regional family of Southeast Asia. Vietnam has since signed the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation and been given observer status as a first step towards full membership in 
ASEAN which may occur later this year. 
U.S. relations with Vietnam continue to improve with the lifting of the U.S. trade 
embargo in February 1994 and establishing a U.S. liaison office as the first step towards 
full diplomatic relations in early 1995. The future of the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship, 
however, is still tied to the continuing legacy of the Vietnam War with some in Congress 
pushing to link diplomatic and economic relations with a full accounting of all U.S. 
MIAs. 
Laos, a small, poor, landlocked country, still maintains a "special relationship" 
with its socialist neighbor, Vietnam, with whom it is bound by a 25 year treaty of mutual 
33Zain Amri, "The Cambodian Saga Continues," Asian Defence Journal (August 1994), 29. 
33 
security. The Lao government has been fighting insurgent groups, primarily from the 
Hmong highland minority, ever since coming to power in 1975. These groups, however, 
have never posed a threat to the central government. Vientiane's suspicions of external 
support for these guerrillas by the Thai government or at least elements of the Thai army, 
continue to strain Thai-Lao relations. "Thailand has clamped down on the use of its 
territory for sanctuary by resistance elements fighting the LPDR [Lao People's 
Democratic Republic], one of two outstanding issues that had for years impeded the 
improvement of relations between the two governments (the other being that of territorial 
claims that have still not been completely settled)."35 
The last decade has seen two fundamental shifts in Southeast Asian security. The 
first is a shift away from counter-insurgency to conventional warfighting. This is a shift 
from an internal to an external threat focus and has been brought about by the end of the 
Cold War and relative victory over insurgencies within the ASEAN states. Exceptions 
to this are the Philippines, which is still fighting communist insurgents and Muslim 
rebels, and the Indonesian conflict in East Timor. The second shift has been from a land 
based to a maritime threat. This shift has been driven by a recognition throughout 
Southeast Asia of the role of coastal states and by expanded maritime interests. 
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In general, the division of maritime states into naval powers and coastal states has 
been based on a maritime capability for power projection. Power projection is the ability 
to conduct offensive operations from the sea at great distance from a nations home 
waters. This capability can be provocative by its very nature because it can support 
offensive operations. The maritime capabilities traditionally associated with power 
projection are aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, long range logistical support 
ships, and nuclear powered submarines. These ships provide air defense, anti-submarine 
warfare, and logistical support to get a force in theater; and air superiority, anti-surface 
warfare, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious assault, and logistical support for offensive 
operations. 
Helicopter or VSTOL carriers and conventional submarines are more difficult to 
characterize. These carriers by themselves have not been able to provide air superiority 
against a modern land based threat but could be provocative as a compliment to other 
forces or against a less capable land-based threat. Conventional submarines are also a 
threat in a regional context where speed, range, and staying power are not critical. 
The capability to defend against an attack from the sea, the mission of coastal 
defense, is the most common justification for a maritime force and is characterized by 
smaller ships of limited range and shore based rather than sea based aircraft. The size 
and makeup of a coastal defense navy depends on the capabilities of potential enemies, 
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susceptibility of coastal installations (such as ports and naval bases) to attack, and a 
nation's financial resources.36 
With the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which went 
into force in November 1994, the average coastal state has found its jurisdiction over the 
sea adjacent to its coast greatly expanded. With a 12 nautical mile territorial sea and an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) out to 200 nautical miles, many coastal states find that 
they are unable to adequately control these waters. According to Desmond Ball, this new 
maritime regime "has generated requirements for surveillance and power-projection 
capabilities over resource-rich areas which, for many states in the region, are greater than 
their land areas."37 Those with sufficient economic resources have been expanding their 
maritime forces in response to this gap in capability. 
With the increasing jurisdiction of coastal states over their adjacent waters, in 
addition to the traditional role of coastal defense, another role, that of constabulary 
missions, has been added. Constabulary forces are used to police these new maritime 
regions against piracy, smuggling, and drug trafficking; to protect marine fishery and 
maritime mineral resources; and to provide for safety of navigation and rescue 
operations. These forces may consist of long range, land based surveillance aircraft and 
small, fast, lightly armed coastal patrol boats used to interdict those engaged in illegal 
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activity or to respond to emergencies. These forces may be backed up by larger coastal 
defense ships such as frigates, corvettes, or fast attack craft. 
In addition, Southeast Asia is a maritime region strategically located at the nexus 
of Pacific trade. To the south and west, the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda Strait, and the 
Lumbok Strait provide the main passage between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, to 
the north, through the disputed South China Sea, lies the mainland of East and Southeast 
Asia, Japan and Russia, and to the northeast lies the Philippines and the Surigao and the 
San Bernadino Straits. These maritime trade routes carry twenty-five percent of the 
world's shipping through a region that relies almost exclusively on shipping for interstate 
trade. 
The Straits of Malacca, part of the territorial waters of Indonesia and Malaysia, 
and the Sunda and Lumbok Straits, which fall within the archipelagic waters of 
Indonesia, are considered international straits by current international law; but this does 
not make them immune to tests of sovereignty by those nations which border them.  In 
1988, Indonesia closed shipping lanes through the Sunda and Lumbok Straits.38   This 
action, contrary to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention which it had ratified, was 
justified by arguing that these straits were part of their archipelagic waters and not 
international straits. 
As the sovereignty and sovereign rights of littoral states have 
grown over the past several decades, ocean regions formerly considered 
38Bergin, Anthony, "New Developments in the Law of the Sea," in Hugh Smith and Anthony 
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the 'high seas' have been eliminated.... Piratic activity which physically 
occurred on what was once the 'high seas' and thus, according to 
customary and conventional international law would have been within the 
jurisdiction of any powerful state to repress, now falls within the 
enforcement jurisdiction of various littoral states, which may not have the 
requisite economic or technical resources to deal effectively with the 
problem.39 
D.       MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES 
Since the adoption of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, disputes over 
maritime boundaries have sharpened. These include: 
. The competing claims of Indonesia and Malaysia to the islands of Sipadan, 
Sebatik, and Ligitan, in the Celebes Sea, some 35 km from Semporna in 
Sabah; 
• The dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over ownership of the island of 
Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca), some 55 km east of Singapore in the Straits 
of Johor; 
• The dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang; 
• Boundary dispute between Indonesia and Vietnam on their demarcation line 
on the continental shelf in the South China Sea, near Natuna Island; 
. Boundary dispute between Malaysia and Vietnam on their off-shore 
demarcation line; 
.    Boundary dispute between China and Vietnam on their demarcation line on 
- the continental shelf in the Tonkin Gulf; 
. Competing claims to the Paracel Island (Xisha Quandao or Quan Doa Hoang 
Sa) in the South China Sea, contested by China and Vietnam; and 
. Competing claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, contested by 
Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
39
 David L. Scott, "Piracy, terrorism, and Crime at Sea," (Paper presented to A Colloquium: 
Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 1993), 3. 
38 
The formal disagreement between Malaysia and the Indonesia dates back to 1967 
when the two first began technical discussions over their maritime boundaries.   Their 
mutual boundary is an area that has not historically been well delineated and has been 
complicated by 
the presence of a myriad of islands, islets, and reefs in the Sabah-Sulu 
maritime zone where maritime boundaries have not been strictly 
administered in the past. The colonial treaties also clash with the 
provision of the most recent 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea.40 
While recent surveys of the disputed region have been accepted by both parties, their 
main dispute centers around their overlapping claims over the Ligitan and Sipadan 
Islands which lie offshore, between the eastern Indonesian province of Kalimantan and 
the Malaysian state of Sabah.  Both have agreed to settle their dispute through bilateral 
negotiations but acknowledge the possibility of third party arbitration. While Indonesia 
desires the regional forum of the ASEAN High Council, Malaysia desires arbitration by 
the International Court of Justice. 
A small island, little more than a rock, called Pedra Branca by Singapore and 
Pulau Batu Putih by Malaysia and situated some 55 miles northeast of Singapore in the 
Straits ofJohor is the focus of a dispute by the two states. Administered by Singapore for 
over 150 years, the island houses the Horsburgh lighthouse and a radar station. Both 
counties have agreed in principle to a diplomatic settlement, but the negotiations have 
dragged on for the past 10 years. In spite of loud posturing by both sides, the economic 
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future of the southern Malaysian state of Johor and Singapore are increasingly entwined 
and this dispute will eventually end, returning the two countries to a pragmatic if not 
problem-free state.41 
Other disputes in the region include the dispute between Malaysia and Brunei 
over the island of Limbang, the Chinese and Vietnamese offshore demarcation, and 
overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand. Malaysia and Brunei have agreed to find a 
bilateral solution to their dispute over the territory of Limbang and following Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir's visit to Brunei in 1993, the dispute, while not resolved has 
been set aside. 
Vietnam has disputed claims over their mutual off-shore demarcation lines with 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and China. With Indonesia, the dispute is over the demarcation line 
on the continental shelf near Natuna Island and with China, similar disputes in the 
Tonkin and Beibu Gulfs. In August 1993 Vietnam and China began negotiations aimed 
at sorting out their oil rights in the Tonkin Gulf and territorial claims in the South China 
Sea. In the Gulf of Thailand, Vietnam, along with Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Thailand, each claim a 200 nautical mile EEZ. These claims overlap and have yet to 
be resolved. 
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With the expanded rights of coastal states as a result of UNCLOS III, the South 
China Sea is considered a semi-enclosed sea, often referred to as a geographical lake. It 
is bordered by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines with China and Taiwan to 
the north. Not only do all these nations have conflicting historical claims to this area, but 
there are numerous regional disputes resulting from overlapping EEZs. 
The South China Sea consists of about a quarter of a million square miles 
containing within its boundaries two main island groups, the Paracel and Spratly Islands. 
The Paracel Islands, located southeast of the Gulf of Tonkin, are disputed by Vietnam 
and China. The Spratlys, which consist of approximately 100 islands, coral reefs, shoals, 
atolls, and sandpits, are located 230 miles east of Vietnam and over 600 miles south of 
China's Hainan Island.43 
The South China Sea is strategically situated on one of the busiest maritime trade 
routes in the world, through which twenty-five percent of the world's shipping passes,44 
including vital oil supplies for the rapidly growing economies of Northeast Asia and 
China, which is estimated to become a net oil importer in 1995. As important to the 
claimants, however, are the actual and potential resources that lie beneath the South 
China Sea. 
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The area is a rich fishery, providing a harvest of 2.5 million tons in 1980, but oil 
is fueling the current drive to exert sovereignty over these islands. A December 1989 
Chinese report has claimed that the sea floor around the Spratly Islands may contain from 
1 billion to 105 billion barrels of oil.45 Little exploration has been done to settle this 
claim and claimants appear to be positioning themselves in any case. 
Non-claimant states are interested in the outcome of these claims because of the 
dangers to international navigation and the effect on regional peace and security. These 
non-claimants include Indonesia within the region and the external powers of Australia, 
Japan, and the United States. Australia, which is dependent on trade through the 
disputed region claims a unique position from which to influence the dispute. Being 
closely tied to the region, but not to any specific country and having no claims to the 
South China Sea, Australia is seen as having "neither a partisan nor a hegemonic agenda" 
in the dispute and has the opportunity to reinforce its standing within the region.46 
Prior to 1974, the Eastern Paracels were occupied by China and the Western 
Paracels by Vietnam. In 1974, taking advantage of the weakness of the South 
Vietnamese government, China seized the Western Paracels and made an unsuccessful 
attempt to seize the Spratly Islands.47  While this action was criticized at the time by the 
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North Vietnamese, it was not until 14 March 1988 that a military confrontation between 
the two powers occurred. 
Only Vietnam and China of the five claimants insist on their right of sovereignty 
over the entire archipelago.    The remaining claimants have limited claims.    The 
Philippines, which refers to the islands as the Kalayaan (Freedom) Islands, claims some 
60 islets as well as additional claims to the continental shelf territorial waters of the 
eastern Paracel Islands.  Malaysia claims three islands and four groups of rocks, while 
Brunei only claims Louisa Reef. China, in an attempt to institutionalize her claims, upset 
those claimants in Southeast Asia when the 
National People's Congress (NPC) in February 1992 adopted a 'Law of 
the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone,' laying down China's exclusive claim over the entire Spratly 
archipelago and authorizing the Chinese navy to evict 'trespassers' by 
force.48 
This action and the limited use of force as occurred in 1988, are in stark contrast with the 
official preference of all claimants for a negotiated solution. In the interim, all claimants 
continue to emphasize their right to their current possessions and to strengthen their 
military patrols.49 "Since 1983," according to Jon Sparks, "with the exception of Brunei, 
each of these nations has maintained garrisons in the Spratly Islands.   Currently, the 
Spratly Islands support 42 scientific or military outposts."50 
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The smaller states have used ASEAN as a means to internationalize the Spratly 
issue and to gain more leverage against China. They have also tried to elicit support 
from the United States and Japan by establishing closer ties; but the United States, while 
urging a peaceful resolution, has been careful to remain neutral. To counter this effort, 
China has tried to keep negotiations bilateral and has suggested co-development, 
temporarily setting the issue of sovereignty aside. 
The South China Sea is becoming synonymous with dreams of wealth and power. 
In spite of expressed intentions for a negotiated solution, as exploration and development 
continue and resources are proven, and as the claimants themselves develop and their 
need for these resources increase, particularly gas and oil, these claims will harden. 
Currently all negotiations have been bilateral, but this may increase the danger of conflict 
as nations form blocs and take sides. There is also the issue of the "haves verses the have 
nots." Those regional states without claims to the resources of the South China Sea fear 
being left behind and desire a solution that develops the disputed area as "the heritage of 
the region as a whole." 
E.       TRADE, MARKETS, AND INVESTMENT 
Since independence, the countries of Southeast Asia have focused on export- 
oriented development. Beginning primarily with economies dominated by agriculture 
and resource extraction, these countries have made significant progress in the shift 
towards manufacturing and in the case of Singapore, the financial service industry. In 
making this shift, there has been competition for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to 
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finance industrialization and for export markets to sell the products of this 
industrialization. Since intra-regional trade has been small and even today accounts to 
only 20 percent of all trade in the region, these markets have been outside the region; 
primarily with Japan, the United States, and the European Union (EU). 
While this has always been a source of potential conflict, recent trends have 
exacerbated this competition. The first trend is towards regional trading blocs. The 
growth of NAFTA and the expansion of the EU, while not increasing external barriers, do 
generate internal preferences that result in an increase in intra-regional trade at the 
expense of non-members. Second, with the end of the Cold War has come the 
emergence of the Asian "market-socialist" economies of China and Vietnam. Both of 
these trends result in further competition for markets and investment capital. A third 
development is the increasing economic mobility of the Multinational Corporation 
(MNC) and jobs. The low cost and ease of shipping has allowed the MNC to quickly 
relocate factories to follow the comparative advantage in wages and terms. 
F.        THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN ARMS BUILDUP: A NEW PHENOMENON 
This region is experiencing an arms buildup and modernization that some have 
characterized as an arms race. This arms buildup consists of a shift from low technology, 
ground based forces to high technology, naval forces. Why is this arms buildup and 
modernization occurring at a time when Southeast Asia is experiencing its most profound 
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peace since decolonization?    This section examines the "facts of the matter" and 
evaluates the degree of concern to the United States.51 
The fundamental problem is to examine the various motives for recent arms 
acquisitions.  The first of these is regional economic growth.   Much of Southeast Asia 
has been undergoing a dramatic economic boom for the past two decades, with double 
digit growth rates in some cases and real increases in gross domestic product (GDP). 
These states find themselves with the economic resources available to permit a greater 
allocation to the defense sector. This is of no great concern to the United States because 
all the states are spending far less than they might be expected to spend: 
In other words, the rate of growth of defense expenditures has generally 
been less than the rate of growth of GNP, so that defense spending as a 
percentage of GNP has generally fallen over the past decade. In the case 
of Indonesia, for example, it fell from 3 percent in 1981 to 1!6 percent in 
1991; in Malaysia, it fell from 5.8 percent in 1981 to 3.4 percent in 1991; 
and in Thailand, it fell from 3.8 percent in 1981 to 2.6 percent in 1991. 
Only in Singapore has the percentage remained fairly constant ~ and that 
is precisely because the defense budget has been officially "pegged" at 6 
percent of GDP.52 
An additional motive for the new arms buildup is desire for force modernization. 
This includes a shift towards high technology and the use of "force multipliers." Where 
a quick look at regional arms purchases would indicate a buildup, these states have been 
purchasing weapon systems such as ships and aircraft as direct, and in many cases, one 
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for one replacements of older systems. While providing an increase in capability, the 
effect of the buildup is mitigated by this retirement of older systems. Much of this 
modernization has a legitimate basis and the effect on the regional balance of forces 
should not be exaggerated. 
This arms buildup has been expedited by a surplus of weapons on the world 
market. The Western arms suppliers in Europe, but mainly the United States, have seen a 
boom in arms sales due to the "Gulf War effect" or the desire for high technology 
weapons such as high performance aircraft, smart bombs, and missiles as well as C3I 
while the former Soviet bloc countries find themselves without their traditional client 
markets and with a surplus of Cold War equipment, new and old, to be sold at bargain 
prices. All suppliers find themselves trying to extend production lines to reduce cost and 
maintain jobs while the former Soviet bloc scrambles for hard currency with everything 
up for sale. 
In a sense, Amitav Acharya argues that "the boom in the regional arms market is 
caused as much by competition among the suppliers as that among the buyers.... In this 
situation, regional countries sense a unique opportunity to modernize their capabilities 
on highly favorable terms."53 This rush to buy arms is a result of a legitimate need 
coupled with the economic resources brought together with a source of competitively 
priced, high quality weapons.   The regional countries appear to be purchasing not so 
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much in response to specific threat as not to miss a buying opportunity that may not be 
repeated. 
This can be seen in the Indonesian bargain basement purchase of 39 ships from 
the former East German Navy, Malaysia's decision to buy 18 MiG-29s from Russia, and 
Thailand's interest in bargaining rice for MiG-29s.54 Malaysia was even able to play the 
United States off Russia to receive a better price and aircraft. According to Acharya, a 
Western military official said that "if Russia fulfilled its promise, Malaysia would have 
'the most advanced MiG-29 the Russians had ever put together'."55 
While "prestige" may only be a secondary reason behind these arms purchases, it 
remains a strong motivation of its own from the perspective of some Southeast Asian 
states. This has been cited as one of the reasons behind the push towards high 
technology weapons such as Malaysia's quest for an advanced jet fighter after Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Singapore decided to acquire the F-16 from the United States. In 1988, the 
Malaysian Air Force chief expressed his concern that the Royal Malaysian Air Force was 
no longer the regional leader in the field of advanced fighter aircraft.56 
A more recent example is the purchase of a Spanish helicopter carrier by 
Thailand scheduled for delivery in 1997. While this carrier provides Thailand with the 
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only such capability in Southeast Asia, it is to be fitted out with royal apartments which 
has led some analysts to believe it will be "little more than a prestigious royal yacht."57 
An additional motive for the arms buildup can be found in Southeast Asia's 
response to the post-Cold War policies of the external powers. One of the primary 
security concerns in Southeast Asia has been the perceived withdrawal of a U.S. 
commitment to the region. The United States pulled out of Subic Bay Naval Base and 
Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 1992 when the basing agreement was not extended. 
Although U.S. forces have not been reduced as much in Asia as in Europe, the perception 
in Asia is clear. The U.S. presence and therefore commitment to the region has been 
reduced. 
To remain engaged in Southeast Asia, the United States must first fight this 
perception. Admiral Larson, then USCINCPAC, laid out the objectives for U.S. policy in 
Asia: "engagement and participation during peace time, deterrence and cooperation in 
crisis and unilateral victory in conflict. It is built of three pillars: preserving existing 
alliances and friendships; maintaining a forward presence in order to demonstrate 
America's continued commitment to regional security and stability; and ensuring the 
ability, if necessary, to react to crisis."58 
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With the perceived power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the United States, 
regional states with great power ambitions may expand to fill that role. These states 
include China and Japan to the north and India to the west. Russia, which has virtually 
disengaged from the region, must also be counted as a future threat or influence in the 
region. 
Because of the changes in the strategic environment which Southeast Asia is 
helpless to prevent, the nature of their arms acquisitions is perfectly understandable. The 
shift towards a maritime focus in Southeast Asia, as outlined in the previous section, 
translates into what Desmond Ball describes as a "significant degree of consistency in 
acquisitions programs."59 These acquisitions include: 
National command, control, communications, and intelligence (C I) systems; 
Multi-role fighter aircraft, with maritime attack capabilities as well as air 
superiority capabilities; 
Maritime surveillance aircraft; 
Anti-ship missiles; 
Modern surface combatants; 
Submarines; 
Electronic warfare (EW) systems; and 
Rapid deployment forces.60 
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While this trend is occurring throughout the Asia-Pacific, it is occurring in 
Southeast Asia on a much smaller scale. The great powers of the Asia-Pacific have little 
to fear from the individual or combined forces of Southeast Asia but as has been shown, 
the reverse is not true. In addition, this buildup could, in time, be destabilizing on an 
intra-regional basis. 
Sislin and Mussington define destabilizing arms acquisitions "as those arms 
acquisitions which increase perceptions of invulnerability in the state which imports or 
produces them, or which increase feelings of vulnerability in neighbors."61 They have 
broken this down into six general characteristics of destabilizing acquisitions: 
• Those which decrease warning time; 
• Those providing breakthrough capabilities; 
• Arms leaving no effective defense; 
• Systems which provide  an asymmetrical transparency of a neighbor's 
capability and military preparations; 
• Broadening those targets which are at risk; and 
• Those which by their nature engender hostile feelings in neighbors.62 
The following are significant details of the recent acquisitions of individual states 
in the region. The major emphasis of the Indonesian Navy remains maritime patrol and 
surveillance and updated Boeing 737 maritime patrol aircraft have returned to service 
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and a number of maritime patrol CN235s are to be acquired. Work continues refitting 
and arming the 39 former East German warships as they are received. This 
modernization, training, and integration burden, which is projected to cost in excess of 
one billion dollars, will tax the Indonesian Navy for the next several years and will limit 
other desired programs. 
While Indonesia is currently the only state in the region to operate a submarine 
force, with two German Type 209 submarines, the desire to purchase two additional 
German Type 209/1300 boats is unresolved due to their budget constraints. 
As with some other regional actors, Malaysia has placed the desire for submarines 
behind the need to modernize more essential surface forces. The Malaysian Navy is 
scheduled to take delivery this year of the first of two modern frigates being built at 
Yarrow Shipbuilding in the UK. They are also expected to place an order for 12 offshore 
patrol vessels with long-range plans for as many as 37. The Malaysian Air Force has 
decided to purchase both the Russian MiG-29 and the U.S. F/A-l8 aircraft. The MiG-29s 
will begin arriving in late 1995. The Malaysian Army has recently completed the 
formation of a new brigade size Rapid Deployment Force, the first of its kind in 
Southeast Asia. 
Singapore has received four F50 Enforcer maritime patrol aircraft, however, "the 
biggest naval decision is to form a submarine service, starting with type 206, secondhand, 
German-built diesel-electric submarines. Although some 20 years old, these small 500- 
ton boats are optimized for operations in shallow and confined waters. They will make a 
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significant contribution to the reconnaissance and anti-submarine capabilities of the 
Republic of Singapore." To this, Singapore will add six new missile-armed fast-attack 
craft and are planning to replace their remaining World War II era landing ships. 
The pride of Thailand is the Chakri Naruebet, a helicopter carrier, being built by 
Bazan in Spain that is capable of carrying 15 Sea King helicopters. With a ski-jump 
ramp, it is also capable of carrying and launching up to 12 Harrier II, short takeoff and 
vertical landing, aircraft. This carrier is scheduled to be delivered in 1997 while original 
plans for a second carrier as well as desires for a submarine force have been placed on 
hold by budget constraints. 
Thailand has also recently added four Chinese Jianghu-IV class frigates to its 
inventory and increased maritime surveillance and ASW capability by the addition of 
three P-3A Orion aircraft. The Royal Thai Airforce is buying secondhand F-5Es to 
replace those lost through attrition and will receive a second batch of U.S. F-16A/Bs in 
1995. Four surplus U.S. E-2C Hawkeyes are also on order. 
Unlike the rest of the ASEAN states, the Philippines has been under extreme 
fiscal austerity with economic growth at less than 1 percent and has had to scale back 
most programs for modernization with existing units suffering from lack of maintenance 
and training. This situation will not be remedied soon. 
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Indochina, a diverse region, is made up of countries just coming out from under 
years of military conflict. Their economies are just starting to recover and their military 
forces have been largely dominated by land forces. These land forces are being cut 
dramatically and there is no corresponding buildup in naval forces as in the more 
developed states in the region. This trend will continue for the foreseeable future. 
Burma has received up to US$1.4 billion worth of arms and military equipment 
from China. This is a majority of all arms imported by Burma since the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) took control of Burma in September 1988 and 
international sanctions were imposed. These arms include a wide range of weapons 
including fighter and transport aircraft and ground combat and communications 
equipment. 
To summarize the regional arms buildup, and its degree of concern to the United 
States, two questions must be answered: first, is the current arms buildup legitimate 
modernization or is it deliberately destabilizing; and second, is the arms buildup 
legitimate modernization or is it a veiled arms race? It is clear that those forces which 
support what has been described as maritime constabulary missions are driving the 
buildup. These include surface combatants that range in size from frigates to fast-attack 
craft and coastal patrol boats, with the total numbers increasing as the size decreases. 
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These are potentially destabilizing because the capability of these ships is so 
much greater than those they replace. This is particularly true because this advanced 
capability includes electronic warfare (EW), anti-missile defense, and surface to surface 
anti-ship missiles. Where the total numbers of all categories of vessels except the very 
smallest is actually dropping, as states replace and retire older vessels (many of World 
War II vintage), the real military capability of states in the region is increasing. 
A second buildup is occurring in maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft. These 
aircraft allow states to patrol their large offshore regions in conjunction with the vessels 
discussed above. These aircraft also provide early warning and intelligence which can 
increase warning time and in that sense is stabilizing. 
Third, there is a modernization in progress of high performance jet aircraft. This 
appears to be driven as much by supplier competition and regional prestige as by any real 
need. This modernization by itself is not destabilizing because these aircraft are not 
being purchased in large numbers and the ability to integrate them into the existing forces 
will be a challenge for these small states. Integration of forces is further complicated by 
the purchase of Russian aircraft which have uncertain maintenance and supply support. 
Finally, there is a destabilizing desire to obtain submarines from many states in 
the region. Currently Indonesia has two and it appears that Singapore will soon join the 
club. These weapons systems are disturbing in a region dominated by maritime states 
that depend on maritime trade that could be easily disrupted by a state possessing 
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submarines.   This capability also attracts the attention of external powers that also 
depend on the free flow of raw materials, goods, and oil through the region. 
Stability in Southeast Asia is simplified, however, by the removal of three 
contributors to instability present in the broader Asia-Pacific. The first is the absence of 
indigenous arms production in the categories of weapons considered destabilizing. The 
second is the absence of any threat of or development of weapons of mass destruction or 
terror weapons. The Philippines is the only state in Southeast Asia that has experimented 
with a civilian nuclear power program and has since backed away from it and no regional 
state has make any attempt to develop an indigenous nuclear industry. Terror weapons, 
such as chemical and biological, could be developed indigenously due to the low 
technology involved, but Southeast Asia has a healthy aversion towards and strong norms 
against their use. 
Finally, while the proliferation of accurate, long-range ballistic missiles and their 
technology is a prominent concern in East Asia and South Asia, Southeast Asia has yet to 
join those developing indigenous capability for commercial space programs or for 
defense. This is true for economic reasons but also because they are not threatened intra- 
regionally by these weapons and external powers such as China and India, that possess 
them, have been too preoccupied with each other to threaten the region. 
If these technologies were to breakout in Southeast Asia they would be 
destabilizing not only by their very nature but also by the break with existing norms it 
would represent. While this is possible, the chance of this occurring is unlikely. 
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The arms buildup in Southeast Asia has also been characterized by some as an 
arms race. An arms race would be politically disruptive, a diversion of funds from 
economic development, and a source of regional tension and insecurity. Since even a 
perceived arms race could result in further escalation, it is important to accurately 
characterize the nature of the maritime buildup in progress. For an arms race to take 
place, Colin Grey argues that the following four basic conditions must be met: 
• There must be two or more parties, conscious of their antagonism; 
. They must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable 
effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or as a deterrent to, other arms race 
participants; 
• They must compete in terms of quantity and/or quality; and 
• There must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality.65 
In Southeast Asia, while there are numerous unresolved disputes, the main threats 
of the past, the Indochina problem and Cold-War great power competition, have been 
removed. All powers with interests in the region have agreed in principle or by treaty to 
the peaceful resolution of disputes. Even China, with a long history of settling boundary 
disputes through the use of military force, recognizes the need for stability in the region 
to support their long term goal of economic development. In response to joining the 
ARF, China's foreign minister declined to sign the  1976  Treaty of Amity and 
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Cooperation, but did state that "his country could support its principles without 
'necessarily having to join or accede to it'."66 
There is no evidence that any of the states of Southeast Asia are in competition 
with each other in terms of quantity or quality, or that their current or planned forces are 
being purchased with a specific threat in mind. If this is true, then why is Southeast Asia 
spending so much on attack aircraft, light surface combatants, and anti-ship missiles? 
According to Jenkins, "the short answer is that this is an important maritime region. 
These states are anxious to exercise sovereignty over their territorial waters, to guard 
against the plunder of their resources, to clamp down on piracy and smuggling, and to 
maintain internal security."67 
The best way to characterize these purchases is for contingency planning by states 
whose economic growth has given them the financial capability to modernize a small and 
aging force during a period of regional security uncertainty. A second reason is the 
availability and low cost of modern weapons as the competition by defense suppliers in a 
shrinking world market and "fire sales" from the republics of the former Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact produces a buyers market. 
Rapid increase in quantity or quality of forces may be taking place, but alone does 
not make an arms race. This increase is partly explained by a shift in the mix of weapon 
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systems being purchased. In the past, weapons were bought "to be used primarily within 
their own borders, against domestic threats some of which received external support to 
statehood and regime structure. By contrast, the current arms acquisitions are geared to 
meet external threats."68 This increase has also been explained in terms of increased 
need and availability. 
Another feature of the Southeast Asian arms buildup is the recognition by 
ASEAN members of the danger of an arms race and steps taken to include confidence- 
building measures (CBM) in the framework of the newly formed ARF to reduce intra- 
regional and international concern. They are increasingly receptive to the idea of holding 
discussions "which would lead to identification of measures to prevent strategic 
misunderstanding, enhance transparency, and check the proliferation of arms."69 
It would be more correct to characterize what is being seen in Southeast Asia as a 
defense reorientation and modernization than an arms buildup. While the capability of 
the new forces are superior to those they replace, there is no real buildup. Older systems, 
many of World War n vintage, are being retired at as rapid a pace. It is clear that the 
states in the region are not in an arms race. They are making very pragmatic decisions on 
arms purchases and recognize that they do not have unlimited resources and must limit 
their desires or slow acquisition rates rather than increase defense spending. 
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With this said, one area of concern remains, the purchase of submarines by 
Indonesia and now Singapore with the resulting desire of their neighbors to obtain this 
capability for themselves. It is for cases such as these that ASEAN's new initiatives 
towards confidence-building measures and transparency will be required. 
From this survey of the current and developing conflicts of interest in Southeast 
Asia, the following conclusions can be made. First, the overarching bi-polar conflict has 
been removed from the region and with it much of the direct support, or intervention, in 
regional affairs by external powers. This has coincided with relative superiority of 
legitimate governments over traditional insurgencies with the exception of the 
Philippines and the non-ASEAN states. What is left are the old territorial disputes that 
have been in the background since decolonization. These disputes have not increased in 
number or severity since the end of the Cold War and do not threaten peace and stability 
in Southeast Asia. 
Maritime disputes, on the other hand, have increased in both number and severity 
in the last decade and provide the primary source of external security concern for the 
nations of Southeast Asia. These concerns are primarily economic; not only because of 
their affect on trade, which is their lifeline, but also because of the resources that may lie 
beneath these disputed waters. 
Finally, the very real arms buildup taking place in Southeast Asia, as in the rest of 
the Asia-Pacific, could develop into an arms race in the future. In the event of any future 
conflict this raises the stakes for all concerned. One of those concerned is the United 
States, who, being as dependent on trade for economic prosperity as those in the region, 
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but also needing access to vital sea lanes through Southeast Asia for the transit of U.S. 
military forces in the event of renewed conflict in the Middle East or elsewhere. U.S. 
security, while not threatened by these indigenous conflicts or by a regional military 
buildup that is small by comparison to U.S. Pacific forces, are engaged in the 
maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, an interest the United States has in 
common with the region. 
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IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: EXTERNAL 
The preceding chapter analyzed the conflicts of interest between the Southeast 
Asian states themselves.   This chapter now turns to relations between states outside 
Southeast Asia whose interests in the region are in conflict. 
A.       THEIR NEAR NEIGHBORS 
The Commonwealth of Australia was formed on 1 January 1901 but the new 
nation continued to be dependent on the Royal Navy for protection. This dependence 
shifted during World War II to the United States and relations between the two countries, 
still allied by the ANZUS treaty, are as strong today. U.S. policy in Asia is generally 
viewed with favor in Australia. 
Australia views its future, however, as most closely tied to Southeast Asia, 
including Indochina. In the future, Australian defence policy intends to strengthen 
bilateral defense relations with the region. Currently, Australia conducts or participates 
in bilateral and regional exercises and maintains regular military to military contact 
through senior-level seminars. Training of Southeast Asian personnel is conducted 
through the government-sponsored Defence Cooperation Program.70 
In a policy of "comprehensive engagement," Australia foresees building positive 
relationships with Southeast Asia that will promote economic development and regional 
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security. Economically, Australia understands that its interests are closer to Southeast 
Asia than to Europe where there is a potential market of 370 million people by the year 
2000. Australia, however, must become more competitive to take advantage of that 
potential. 
Australian security, while tied to Southeast Asia is also threatened by Indonesia's 
burgeoning population and its location as a near neighbor. Australia still fears an 
unprotected northern coast. Indonesia, on the other hand, needs assurances against 
Australia's concentration of forces there. Australia is also looking to the west and India's 
seagoing doctrine in the Indian Ocean. 
Australia has had a long history of participation in regional development 
beginning with the Colombo plan for economic development, followed by the Five 
Power Defense Arrangement, and in 1974, selection as ASEAN's first dialogue partner. 
This interest continues with participation in the ARF and the proposal for the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as a non-exclusive economic organization to 
counter the Malaysian proposal for the East Asian Economic Caucus. This multilateral 
approach, however, is still seen as a supplement rather than a replacement for traditional 
bilateral relationships which are still the foundation of Australian foreign policy. 
The 1994 Australian Defense White Paper considers the U.S. alliance as central 
to Australian defense policy, but it is still a policy of defense self-reliance. This policy is 
similar to U.S. policy, but on a regional scale. It desires international support but must 
ensure the capability to act alone.   Due to Australia's small size, it is important to 
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promote cooperation within the region to minimize defense spending, and an arms race, 
and to allow the region to continue social and economic development.  In keeping with 
this policy continued U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific is essential.71 
After Australia, the People's Republic of China is of most concern to Southeast 
Asia.   After its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic of China has, with the 
exception of supporting insurgencies and her role in the Vietnam conflict, ostensibly, 
stayed out of Southeast Asian affairs. The end of the Cold-War, however, coincides with 
a resurgent China that looks to be a major power in Asia today and a great power in 
world affairs in the future. 
China appears committed to improving its naval force structure in order to 
prosecute its territorial claims in the South China Sea and to support its 
other 'interests.' Its People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) currently 
possesses only coastal (or near-coastal) capabilities, but relaxation of 
tensions with Moscow has allowed the PLAN to build toward a deep- 
water navy. Concomitantly, the PLAN has developed a new 'offshore 
defense doctrine,' intended to effectively control territorial waters 
extending to the boundaries of its 200-mile EEZ, 'although it stretches to 
more then 1000 km in the South China Sea if the Spratlys are included.'72 
With this strategic vision China has put a great deal of emphasis on the four 
modernizations   especially   economic   expansion   and   its   spin-off   for   military 
modernization.   This translates into a naval buildup that is seen as a future threat to 
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Southeast Asia. The major focus of this threat today is the South China Sea where the 
China's position was best articulated by the passage of a territorial waters' law in 
February 1992 which reasserted Beijing's "undisputed sovereignty" over the Spratlys and 
the Paracels.73 
To back up these claims, China has continued to build up its presence in the 
region to include listening posts, occupation and garrisoning of islets, and a naval 
presence. This naval presence consists of the deployment of one or two Jianghu frigates 
and supporting vessels on a continuous basis. This may not yet be a formidable force, 
but it shows considerable commitment by the Chinese to support the deployment of ships 
more than 1000 nautical miles from their home bases. 
Southeast Asia's concern over China's role in the South China Sea can be 
summarized in four points: 
.    China's long term goal of becoming a regional maritime power and a 
corresponding maritime buildup; 
.    The strategic value of the South China Sea as well as prestige for the Chinese 
in controlling this vital sea lane; 
• The possibility of rich marine and mineral resources; and 
• A history of Chinese use of military force in the area in spite of agreement to 
pursue peaceful resolution.74 
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Southeast Asia (and India) are also concerned with the degree of Chinese military 
cooperation with Burma which increases the possibility of conflict in the Indian Ocean. 
Their concerns have focused primarily on China's massive arms sales to 
Burma but have been heightened by reports that China is constructing a 
major naval base near the Irrawaddy river delta. There are also 
suggestions that China is developing a maritime reconnaissance facility on 
Burma's Great Coco island, just 30 nautical miles north of India's 
Andaman group.75 
William Ashton argues that there are many reasons for these reports to be overstated but 
that the regional concern and suspicions, which increase the potential for conflict, depend 
more on "the perception of a growing Chinese presence in Burma, and a possible future 
Chinese naval threat in the Indian Ocean, ...than the reality."76 
This Southeast Asian concern for China's military force is one of relative size and 
while it may not be a threat to the United States or Japan due to its technical 
obsolescence, China needs to understand its strategic prominence in the region and 
appreciate Southeast Asia's traditional suspicions of its long-term intentions in the 
77 region. 
While there is concern in Southeast Asia that China may become the next Asian 
hegemon,- the Chinese themselves are more concerned with internal economic 
development and stability.    They desire full participation in developing multilateral 
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organizations such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). With the end of 
the Cold War, and a corresponding end to the Sino-Soviet-U.S. rivalry in Southeast Asia, 
China is no longer a supporter of insurgents in the region. An indication of the extent of 
this lessening of tensions is the normalization of relations between China and the 
ASEAN members. 
Southeast Asia is also aware of the potential threat latent in India, its other great 
power neighbor. India, the largest in area, population, and military power in South Asia 
may aspire to dominance in the Indian Ocean; however, India sees its major threats lying 
to the north and west, primarily in Pakistan and the Middle East. India's interests in Asia 
lie in trade and in the threat from its historical adversary, China. 
India and China, with traditional spheres of influence that overlap in Southeast 
Asia, are eyeing each other suspiciously. While both have come along way towards 
rapprochement since their border clash in 1962, they are at the same time developing 
blue water naval forces. As both India and China develop a blue water naval capability, 
the possibility of extending their traditionally land based threat to the sea, with Southeast 
Asia caught in the middle, is increased. This scenario is years away, however, because 
India's power projection capability is centered on two aging carriers and China's 
realization of the dream of a carrier is fiscally impossible in the near term. 
During the last half of the Cold War, India viewed ASEAN as a pro-Western 
organization and was viewed by ASEAN as having abandoned the non-aligned movement 
in alliance with the Soviet Union. ASEAN was also disturbed by India's intervention in 
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East Pakistan and support of Vietnam after its intervention in Cambodia.    These 
differences soured relations until the end of the Cold War. 
Since 1991, India has given up its policy of "self-sufficient socialism" and has 
begun to deregulate its economy.78 According to George Tanham, India has adopted a 
"look east" policy, and has begun to forge ties with Southeast Asia, especially ASEAN. 
Pursuing a two-track policy, India desires to develop a formal relationship with ASEAN 
as an organization and to develop economic and security ties with individual members.79 
In January 1994, the ASEAN-Indian Joint Sectoral Co-operation committee was 
formed at a meeting in Bali. This is seen by India as a first step towards becoming a 
dialogue partner in the ASEAN post-ministerial conference and further integration into 
Southeast Asian regional economic and security initiatives.80 Furthermore, India is also 
establishing bilateral economic and security relations with individual Southeast Asian 
countries. 
B.       PERCEPTIONS OF MORE DISTANT POWERS 
Of the more distant powers, Japan is most prominent on Southeast Asia's horizon. 
The Japanese, with the largest military budget of any nation in Asia and the most 
formidable force, are tied by their constitution and a bilateral defense treaty to the United 
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States. So long as this remains true, Southeast Asian nations do not see Japan as a threat. 
It is in the potential for transforming economic power to military power that is the cause 
of concern and one of the major reasons that continued U.S. engagement is desired by 
most of the nations of Asia. 
After World War II, in an effort to forge a new relationship with Southeast Asia, 
Japan focused on economic assistance and mutual understanding. This post-war 
economic diplomacy enjoyed American support and lasted until the end of U.S. 
involvement in Indochina. According to Sueo Sudo, the absence of a predominant 
American presence in Southeast Asia "compelled Tokyo to formulate a new framework 
of regional order."81 This new relationship was first articulated by then Prime Minister 
Takeo Fukuda in August 1977 in what became known as the "Fukuda Doctrine." The 
Fukuda Doctrine was directed at ASEAN and was composed of three principles: to reject 
a military role in the region; to consolidate relationships based on mutual confidence and 
trust; and to become an equal partner with ASEAN while fostering mutual understanding 
with the nations of Indochina.82 Japan has not taken an overt economic or political 
leadership role, however, for fear that such a move would be misinterpreted as a revival 
of the prewar concept of a Co-prosperity Sphere. The Fukuda doctrine is still the core of 
Japan's ASEAN policy. 
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Japan has no claims in the region but sees Southeast Asia, and specifically the 
South China Sea, as its lifeline as most of its raw materials and oil pass through this 
region as well as it being a major market for its finished goods. Because of this, stability 
in the region is considered a vital national interest and given any perceived U.S. 
withdrawal sees its role as balancing against the resurgent power of the Chinese in Asia. 
Any threat to the security of the trade routes through Southeast Asia would require 
Japanese participation regardless of U.S. action or inaction. This accounts for their 
emphasis on relations with Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The Japanese military, has slowly expanded its role, with the encouragement of 
the United States, within the scope of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance. This role has grown 
from limited coastal defense to an official defense out to 1000 nautical miles. Japan has 
also, for the first time since World War EL, allowed self-defense forces to be used in 
operations on Asian soil. This use, in support of the UN mission in Cambodia, has 
received general acceptance from Southeast Asia. 
Beyond Japan lies the reality of Russia. Since the end of the Cold War, the old 
Soviet fleet, with the exception of nuclear powered submarines, rarely ventures from 
port. The threat implied in the Soviet presence in Cam Ranh Bay has disappeared. This 
withdrawal is driven entirely by economics and not a desire to disengage from the 
Pacific. A significant Pacific Fleet remains and with a turnaround of the economic or 
political situation, Russia could be a major power in the region again. Current Russian 
influence, however, has disappeared. Its future promises little more than veiled threats 
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that if not given a part in Asian-Pacific affairs it could work to undermine democratic 
reforms in Russia and could result in a resurgent Russian nationalism. A second concern 
is the sale of technology and weapons to the region. 
The European states maintain their economic interests in Southeast Asia, but each 
sees limited opportunities for its own merchants acting alone. The French naturally 
retain an interest in the former states of Indochina and the Dutch have nostalgia for their 
colonial empire in Indonesia. The British of course have significant interests in Burma, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. They are in the wings watching developments in Southeast 
Asia and hoping to maximize their interests by combined actions through the European 
Union. 
C.       THE UNITED STATES 
The United States gives constant assurance of its determination to stay engaged in 
Southeast Asia. Of all the distant powers in which the Southeast Asian states are 
interested, the United States is most prominent. All welcome an American presence and 
look to the United States to preserve an environment of peace and stability. 
The United States made six collective defense arrangements with Asia during the 
post World War II, Cold-War era,    two directly with Southeast Asia.    These six 
relationships were: 
.    The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States 
and Japan; 
•    The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States 
(ANZUS); 
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.    The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the 
Philippines; 
.    The Mutual defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea; 
.    The Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty; and 
.    The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of 
China. 
The first of these treaties was an effort by the United States to forge an alliance in 
Northeast Asia against what was developing into an anti-Soviet Cold War. The ANZUS 
and Philippines treaties were originally accepted as guarantees against a resurgent Japan. 
The remaining treaties represent the development of the containment strategy of 
perimeter defense following the Korean War. The treaty between the United States and 
the Republic of China (Taiwan) was terminated in 1979 following normalization of U.S. 
relations with the People's Republic of China on 15 December 1978. 
These treaties, now remnants of the Cold War, do not form a collective defense 
treaty system. They are all bilateral in nature and only commit the signatories in the 
event of an "armed attack" from the outside to "consult together" and to act "to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." These treaties are also 
not mutual because the applicable "treaty area" only applies to territories in common 
interest in the Pacific. 
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and 
Japan, which still forms the foundation of U.S. Asia policy, was not only to provide 
security for Japan but also to "encourage closer economic cooperation between them and 
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to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries [as well as 
the] maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,"83 two 
contemporary missions of the U.S.-Japan relationship. This treaty and the Mutual 
Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea grant basing rights 
to U.S. forces, elements not present in the remaining treaties. While permanent bases are 
no longer the linchpin of U.S. forward presence, continued stationing of forces in Korea 
and Japan provides a clear indication of continued U.S. commitment to the region. 
Increased burden sharing by the host government has also made the placement of these 
forces overseas a cost effective arrangement. 
In Southeast Asia, the following two bilateral treaties, forged during the Cold 
War, remain in force today. First, the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty signed 
in Manila on 8 September 1954 paved the way for the now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) but remains in effect today on a bilateral basis between the 
United States and Thailand. Second, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United 
States and the Republic of the Philippines was signed in Washington on 30 August 1951 
to satisfy Philippine demands for U.S. security guarantees against a resurgent Japan as a 
precondition to their support for a Peace Treaty with Japan signed that same year. The 
elements of this treaty have not been altered by the Philippine failure to renew the basing 
agreement and subsequent withdrawal of all U.S. military forces in 1992. 
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While the articulated foundation of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific and 
Southeast Asia is this web of bilateral alliances, it is always wise to subject treaties of 
mutual security to reexamination and the United States needs more than allies in the 
region. It is important to maintain strong relations with allies formed during periods of 
adversity and common threat, but in a period of peace with no coherent threat, it is 
equally important to forge new friendships and to work to lower tensions between old 
adversaries. The United States should search for further ways to form inclusive 
relationships in the region while reducing this reliance on exclusive alliances. 
No less important than treaty arrangements are permanent bases and access to 
foreign facilities, forces stationed overseas, and deployed forces which constitute 
American overseas presence. This presence took on its present form following World 
War II as part of the U.S. strategy of containment. The containment strategy of perimeter 
defense included these same elements as well as treaty obligations on the periphery of the 
communist world. U.S. strategy during most of this period was anti-Soviet more than 
anti-communist and with the demise of the Soviet Union, much of this threat has been 
removed. 
Since the end of the Cold War, continued U.S. presence is an essential element of 
U.S. regional security strategy and is welcomed by the region as reassurance of continued 
U.S. commitment to the region. This presence also provides staging areas for U.S. 
forces and material for operations elsewhere. The February 1995 East Asia Strategy 
Report gives the following rational for continued U.S. military forward presence: 
75 
Forward deployed forces in the Pacific ensure a rapid and flexible 
worldwide crisis response capability; discourage the emergence of a 
regional hegemon; enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of 
important issues in the region; enable significant economy of force by 
reducing the number of United States forces required to meet national 
security objectives; overcome the handicaps of time and distance 
presented by the vast Pacific Ocean; and demonstrate to our friends, allies 
and potential enemies alike a tangible indication of the United States' 
interest in the security of the entire region.84 
At the height of the Cold War, U.S. forces were permanently based in the 
Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Following 
the Vietnam War, U.S. forces withdrew from Thailand and Vietnam. Following 
normalization of U.S. relations with mainland China, U.S. forces were withdrawn from 
Taiwan; and after nearly 100 years in the Philippines, the last U.S. forces left in 1992 
following the expiration of basing agreements there. 
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines prompted an outcry from the 
Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia in particular about the strength of U.S. commitment. 
This outcry is similar to that following the withdrawal of U.S. forces at the end of the 
Vietnam War. The United States has reduced its overseas deployed forces not due to a 
lack of commitment but as a part of the overall downsizing that is occurring throughout 
the defense department. According to the Secretary of Defense, 
The United States needs overseas bases to sustain its forward presence and 
to provide facilities for regional contingency operations during periods of 
crises. Our successes in the Persian Gulf were due in no small measure to 
our access to overseas bases.     Foreign bases enhance  deterrence, 
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contribute to regional stability, and facilitate rapid response by U.S. 
forces.85 
In fact, the U.S. has been strengthening alternative relationships to replace the lost 
facilities and understands the need for access to facilities overseas. 
With the loss of the Philippines, the U.S. has withdrawn or redistributed its forces 
within the region. The withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the Philippines 
accelerated the process, foreshadowed in the 1990 East Asia Strategy 
Initiative report, of shifting the US military posture in Southeast Asia from 
a large, permanent presence at a single complex of bases in the 
Philippines to a more widely distributed, less fixed, posture. This posture 
consists of regional access, mutual training arrangements, periodic ship 
visits, intelligence exchanges, and professional military educational 
programs rather than permanently stationed forces.86 
Since   1985,  U.S.   forces  overseas  in  the  Asia-Pacific  have  fallen  from 
approximately 135,000 to their present level of 100,000 in 1995.   This drawdown was 
planned as early as the April 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative Report and has not 
significantly changed, in spite of full withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines. 
The current level is anticipated to hold relatively constant and includes a force of over 
25,000 forward deployed to the region on a temporary basis, the same number as in 1990, 
before the drawdown. U.S. commitment to the region has not changed. 
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Reflecting this new posture, the United States and Singapore signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on 13 November 1990 allowing US. use of facilities 
there. While the United States has been using facilities in Singapore for 25 years, under 
this agreement, "there has been a modest increase in US use of Singapore's ship 
maintenance and repair facilities. Singapore's Paya Lebar airfield is also used for short- 
term rotations by USAF aircraft."87 Following U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines in 
1992, the Singapore government also agreed to host the Seventh Fleet Logistics 
Command, a small staff of approximately 100 people. In the fall of the same year, 
Indonesia signed an agreement allowing the U.S. Navy use of the state-owned Ptpal 
dockyard in Surabaya. The United States now has limited access agreements with 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
A 1994 attempt to reach agreement with Thailand to place propositioning ships 
offshore in the Gulf of Thailand was unsuccessful and other states in the region have 
already come forward to turn down such an idea citing the sensitivity of the region to 
interference by outside powers and the threat of their use to their neighbors. 
To supplement the influence of treaties and forward deployed forces, the United 
States has both short term security and long term economic development goals in 
Southeast Asia. Development assistance has been used not only to better the standard of 
living of people, but also to support U.S. objectives to protect and expand markets and to 
maintain access to supplies of strategic materials. 
87 Ibid., 15. 
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To show support for friends and allies, the United States also continues a wide 
array of military assistance programs. These range from loans (such as the FMF 
program) for military industrial development, grants and Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 
compensation for basing and access agreements, and training and education (such as the 
IMET program). 
From a military point of view, the International Military Education and Training 
(IMET) program has been most useful. It has educated foreign military and civilian 
defense personnel and has also exposed Asian leaders to the American way of life and 
thought. This helps to develop a professional military supportive of fundamental 
democratic institutions, U.S. concepts of civil-military relations, and human rights. 
MET and other forms of military assistance also help foreign forces to operate with the 
United States in a crisis. 
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V.      EXISTING STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
This chapter examines the existing and evolving strategies for conflict resolution 
generally followed in Southeast Asia. These strategies include political, economic, and 
military components and involve all mechanisms of conflict resolution. 
A.       BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Cooperation on multilateral dialogue has been the watchword for social and 
economic development in the region while bilateral relations have been the norm for 
diplomatic and military cooperation. This is only changing slowly. 
Even where external powers are involved, as in the Five Power Defense 
Arrangement, regional involvement remains bilateral with only two regional members, 
Malaysia and Singapore. This organization has sponsored joint air defense exercises at 
the Payar Lebar airport in Singapore for over 20 years.88 Australia has also conducted 
routine bilateral exercises with not only Malaysia and Singapore but also with the 
remaining ASEAN members: Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. These 
exercises have involved land, air, and naval units of participating forces.89 
A second trilateral arrangement of annual exercises sponsored by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore since the late 1970s, covering all three services, have only been 
carried out on a bilateral basis. Joint exercises have been proposed but have never been 
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conducted.   Indonesia and Singapore signed an agreement to establish joint anti-piracy 
patrols and have agreed to set up direct communication to coordinate their response in 
the Straits of Malacca.   They have also agreed to develop a joint bombing range on 
Sumatra. By the end of 1991, Memorandum of Understandings have been signed between 
all the ASEAN member to have some form of military cooperation, including between 
Malaysia and the Philippines.90 
The Indian Navy has carried out joint exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore, since 1990 and has plans to include Thailand in the future. 
These are seen as continuing efforts in military co-operation. In other co- 
operative efforts, Singapore has used Indian missile testing facilities and 
may use other military training facilities. Malaysia in February 1993 
signed a memorandum of understanding with India for defence co- 
operation.91 
This cooperation includes a wide array of military contacts such as training and 
education, exchanges of personnel, and use of facilities.      Southeast Asia is also 
interested in possible sales of Indian military equipment to the region.  This contact can 
do much to ease tensions between India and ASEAN, but may not be viewed as benign 
by China. 
The United States conducts a far reaching program of military exercises with its 
Asian allies: Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.   These exercises, 
which consist of major joint exercises, as well as a large number of smaller military-to- 
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military exercises are conducted primarily on a bilateral basis with Southeast Asia. This 
includes forty, mostly small-scale, joint exercises with Thailand each year as well as a 
continuing program with the Philippines.92 
B.        MULTILATERAL STRATEGIES 
The most obvious feature of Southeast Asia during the half century leading up to 
World War II was conquest and colonial rule by the West. "But if colonial rule spread 
swiftly and planted itself solidly, it departed even more swiftly in the 1940s and 
1950s."93 As the colonial powers departed there began the slow process of nation- 
building, as nationalism grew in Southeast Asia. The legacy of colonialism is still in 
vogue today. Powerful nationalism has led to an antipathy against multinational 
organizations and colonial memories to the mistrust of external powers. Both of these 
have led to difficulty in developing regional organizations within Southeast Asia. 
The development of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region has led to a 
proliferation of organizations with overlapping goals. Of these, I have selected six, three 
unofficial and three official organizations, that have shaped the history of the region. 
These six, while not indigenous Southeast Asian organizations, have a large Southeast 
Asian membership, are seen as successful, and continue today. 
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"In the 1960s and 1970s many concrete suggestions and proposals for economic 
cooperation in Asia and the Pacific began to take shape and to attract region-wide 
attention, if not region-wide support. Four of these initiatives of an essentially private or 
unofficial nature were of particular significance, and had visible impact. In three of the 
four cases, these initiatives led to concrete implementation and institutionalization, well 
beyond the levels envisioned, or even desired by some participants, in their early 
stages."94 
The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), was created in 1967 as a private 
organization with five national committees: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and 
the United States. Although its leadership has been dominated by the highly 
industrialized nations of the Asia-Pacific region, it has grown in membership, activities, 
organization, and effectiveness. The PBEC is an international business association 
whose purpose is to encourage and develop the most favorable climate for business in the 
region. The goal of the PBEC was to promote active support for multinational economic 
cooperation in the Pacific region and to forge ties between different economic 
communities. 
Pacific Trade and Development Conferences (PAFTAD) have been held slightly 
less than annually since 1968. Composed primarily of regional economists, acting as 
individuals and not representatives of their governments, their aim has been to provide a 
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forum for the intelligent consideration of economic policy issues of importance to the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
The PAFTAD has faired better as an all-regional organization than another 
proposal, the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD), which was 
developed along the same lines as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). This is due to the PAFTAD's wide based support and 
membership among the less developed nations while the OPTAD was overwhelmingly 
dominated by the more developed and mostly non-Asian nations. 
The Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) is the most 
comprehensive and the most important of the unofficial regional organizations. Its main 
focus is on economic cooperation, but since it was organized in 1980, it has evolved into 
a forum for all Asia-Pacific nations to discuss a wide range of problems and policies. 
Both the PBEC and PAFTAD are full members of this conference. 
The PECC was formed as a result of two conferences.  During the first, held in 
Canberra in September 1980, the decision was made to make the PECC an unofficial 
organization  with  each   member  providing  a  tripartite   delegation  consisting  of 
representatives of government, business, and academia.  During the second conference, 
held in Bangkok in June 1982, the ASEAN members expressed reservations regarding 
the PECC. These reservations reflected the suspicions of all of the developing countries 
of Asia-Pacific and according to Palmer, 
they feared that the new organization for Asia-Pacific cooperation would 
be dominated by the few developed states of the region, particularly by 
Japan and the United States, and would turn into a "rich man's club" that 
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would not give adequate attention and assistance to less-developed 
members. ASEAN states also feared that their participation in PECC 
might weaken ASEAN, which was increasingly becoming the focus of 
their regional cooperative programs.95 
A widely discussed paper by Hadi Soesastro of Indonesia expressed "five imperatives" 
upon which ASEAN's participation in Asia-Pacific regional cooperative programs would 
depend. These 'five imperatives' were: 
• ASEAN must not be weakened nor its existence and prosperity jeopardized. 
• ASEAN must perceive clear benefits from regional cooperation which in 
totality far exceed the possible costs. 
• The concept must not compromise the non-aligned status of the ASEAN 
states nor enmesh them in political entanglements which they seek to avoid. 
• The concept must not be perceived as a Western, neo-colonial proposal 
devised for Western neo-colonial purposes. 
.    It is important for the ASEAN states to feel that they are not being rushed into 
anything.96 
Among the official regional organizations, three stand out for discussion.   The 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) is one of the 
regional commissions of the United Nations and is the most comprehensive official 
organization in the Asia-Pacific region.   It was originally established in 1947 by the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) as the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), but was renamed in 1974 to reflect its 
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expanding geographic scope and its broader mission. It currently has thirty-seven 
members and seven associate members encompassing almost all nations in the Asia- 
Pacific region as well as South-Asian and European members. 
The Colombo Plan, originally called the Colombo Plan for Cooperative 
Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, was formed in July 1951 by Britain 
and the Commonwealth countries as well as Malaya and British Borneo. It has gradually 
broadened its membership and functions. It now provides assistance for the economic 
and social advancement of most of the nations of the Asia-Pacific region. In 1977, the 
name was changed to the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social 
Development in Asia and the Pacific to reflect this expansion. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1966 under the auspices 
of the ECAFE. There are currently forty-seven member countries, thirty-two from the 
region and fifteen from outside. Those fifteen non-regional members are the developed 
nations of Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. Its largest shareholders and 
contributors are Japan and the United States. During most of its existence these two 
countries made equal contributions to the Asian Development Fund, which is 
administered by the ADB; recently, however, contributions by the United States have 
decreased, while those of Japan have increased. The "ADB has become a major catalyst 
in promoting the development of the most populous and fastest growing region in the 
world today....     The Bank's operations  cover the entire  spectrum of economic 
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development, with particular emphasis placed on agriculture, rural development, energy 
and social infrastructure."97 
These economic organizations have not been formed by indigenous Southeast 
Asian initiatives, they have had wide membership beyond not only Southeast Asia but the 
Asia-Pacific region as well, and in many cases have been under non-Asian, great power 
control; but they have provided a forum for dialogue on regional issues important to 
Southeast Asia and are similar to more recent developments in Asia-Pacific regionalism 
that will be discussed in a later section. 
The first attempt at a regional security organization was the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO). Instigated by the United States, with Secretary of state John 
Foster Dulles in a leading role, it is better described "as a part of the worldwide US-led 
system of anti-Communist military alliances, or security arrangements, than a true 
Southeast Asian regional arrangement. It emerged out of a conference in Manila in 
September 1954, shortly after the Geneva conference on Indochina following the final 
victory of the Viet Minn over the French with the fall of Dienbienphu."98 The 
participating nations were Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. Together they signed a Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty (or the Manila Treaty) and proclaimed a Pacific Charter. The 
treaty area was designated as the "general area of Southeast Asia" although only two 
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Southeast Asian nations were members. The treaty contained provisions for collective 
defense in case of armed attack on its Asian members and designated associate states of 
Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, but by the early 1960s it was already clear that it 
was losing its effectiveness. According to William Tow, the "Kennedy administration's 
refusal to activate SEATO during the Laos crisis of 1960-62 sealed its fate as an 
ineffective collective defense accord."99 Although it survived until after the Vietnam 
War, its provisions were not invoked to support US involvement. SEATO was formally 
dissolved in 1977. 
In 1966, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was organized at the initiative of 
President Park Chung-hee of South Korea. It had some significance as an example of a 
"multi-regional organization designed to bring together most of the leading non- 
Communist nations of the Western Pacific to deal with external threats (many stemming 
from the developments in Indochina) and to provide a framework for more widespread 
cooperation." Its membership consisted of Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand (with Laos as an 
observer). In a joint communique issued at the close of the organizational meeting in 
Seoul, these members announced their "determination to preserve their integrity and 
sovereignty in the face of external threats." At the same time, they agreed that this new 
organization should be "nonmilitary, nonideological, and not anti-Communist."100   This 
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organization, with only four Southeast Asian members, had no clear objectives, little 
support from its membership, and only lasted for seven years. It was dissolved in 
September 1973. 
Two different types of organizations, with more limited objectives and 
membership, were formed in the early 1960s. In response to a proposal by the Malayan 
Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1959, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) 
was formed in July 1961 by Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. It was formed to 
provide socio-economic and technological cooperation, but quickly became a casualty of 
Malaya-Philippine territorial disputes over Sabah which was incorporated into the 
Federation of Malaysian in August 1963. The Philippines refused to recognize this new 
federation due to long-standing claims to Sabah. As a result, the two countries broke off 
diplomatic relations which were not reconciled until 1966. Indonesia decided not to join 
due to Philippine and Thai bilateral military ties to the United States. In spite of its short 
life, ASA is seen as the forerunner of ASEAN. 
Maphilindo was formed by Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia to promote a 
greater Malay Confederation, but each had it own interests. Indonesia and the 
Philippines had desired to block Malaya's incorporation of the Borneo states of Sabah 
and Sarawak into the Federation of Malaysia and Malaya participated to defuse these 
tensions and to prevent a tighter alliance between Indonesia and the Philippines.101 This 
association died at birth, when the Federation of Malaysia was formed in August 1963 
101
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with the inclusion of Singapore and the Borneo states. Neither the Philippines nor 
Indonesia recognized this new federation and the resulting military confrontation 
between Indonesia and Malaysia lasted until Sukarno's fall in 1967. 
These four unsuccessful attempts at regional cooperation failed because of 
limited Southeast Asian membership or the inclusion of and domination by external 
members, especially the great powers. These attempts, however, provided the foundation 
for two success stories, the Five Power Defense Arrangement and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, which will be examined next. 
Prior to their independence, the security of Malaysia and Singapore was the 
responsibility of the United Kingdom. With the formation of independent Malaysia in 
1963, their security and defense was provided by the Anglo-Malaysian Defense 
Arrangement (AMDA). When the British government decided to withdraw their 
remaining forces from Malaysia, it was proposed that this existing arrangement be 
replaced by a new agreement. This new organization, the Five Power Defense 
Arrangement (FPDA) was formally established on 1 November 1971 between Australia, 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore which had left the 
Malaysian Federation in 1965. An Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) was 
established within the framework of the FPDA to assume responsibility for the air 
defense of Malaysia and Singapore. This network coordinates surveillance of the 
Malayan Peninsula and parts of the eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. 
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There are no alliance commitments requiring the physical stationing of 
multinational forces, but instead the FPDA "requires the five nations to consult one 
another in the event of external aggression against Malaysia and Singapore. The 
members will then decide what measures are necessary, jointly or separately, in response 
to the aggression or (impending) threat."102 In recent years, this arrangement has also 
served as a basis for joint military exercises between its members and for the 
management of the IADS. 
Another success story, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), was 
formed in August 1967 with the announcement of the historic "Bangkok Declaration" by 
the original five members: Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. 
Its formation came soon after Indonesia and the Philippines finally extended recognition 
to the Federation of Malaysia and the end of direct confrontation between Indonesia and 
Malaysia that had been going on since 1963.   According to the Bangkok Declaration, 
ASEAN was established 
"to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development 
in the region," "to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance ... 
in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and administrative fields" and 
"to promote regional peace and stability." In spite of the last of these 
stated objectives, the framers of ASEAN insisted that the new 
organization would not deal directly with security matters and would also 
avoid controversial political issues. This stated aversion to formal 
involvement with problems of security and defense and delicate political 
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The association has been particularly concerned about external interference and 
as early as 1971, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration stated the now long standing objective to 
make Southeast Asia a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" (ZOPFAN), free from 
any form or manor of interference by outside powers. 
Although there have been annual ministerial meetings (ASEAN-AMM) of 
member country foreign ministers, there have been only four summits in 27 years. The 
last one, in 1992, decided among other things to schedule further summits at regular 
intervals every three years. The first summit met in Bali in 1976 where the ASEAN 
Secretariat was formed. Two important agreements also came out of this first summit: 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of ASEAN Accord. Together 
these have provided a broad framework for cooperation in the region. 
The fall of Saigon and the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from Vietnam in 
1975 and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the fall of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge 
regime in December 1978 focused ASEAN security concerns on the land-based threat 
from Indochina for the next decade. This threat included the flow of refugees and "boat 
people" from both Vietnam and later Cambodia to primarily Thailand and Malaysia 
which exacerbated the tensions on both sides as well as within ASEAN. In response to 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, a second ASEAN summit was hastily convened in 
Kuala Lumpur less than a year after the first. This summit set the agenda for ASEAN 
until a third summit was held in Manila in 1987. The overriding preoccupation of 
ASEAN being the security problems created by the Communist states of Indochina. 
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Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, completed in 1989, and the removal of 
Soviet support from Vietnam culminated in the Paris Agreements of 1991. This began 
the process of normalization of relations between the Indochina states and the rest of 
Southeast Asia and United Nations peacekeeping and nation-building in Cambodia. This 
easing of tensions removed the unifying threat to ASEAN at the same time the Cold-War 
was ending with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. With the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, its Pacific military successor, Russia, withdrew from the 
region. 
Since the end of colonialism there has been an associated rise in nationalism in 
Southeast Asia. This nationalism has been both the driving force behind many regional 
proposals and the brake applied to limit their success. The nations of Southeast Asia 
have determined that it is in their national interests to cooperate on many areas of 
common concern. They have traditionally concentrated on economic cooperation, but 
over time these interests have expanded to security concerns. 
At the same time, there is a long history of independence on issues that touch on 
national sovereignty. Beginning with the Bangkok Declaration at the formation of 
ASEAN, the members declared their determination "to ensure their stability and security 
[free] from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their 
national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples."104 In 
1971, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration included the affirmation that the member states are 
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"determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect 
for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or 
manor of interference by outside powers."105 This preoccupation with sovereignty and 
non-interference also forms the basis of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and 
the Declaration of ASEAN Accord. The nations of Southeast Asia have found it in their 
individual national interest to use the forum of ASEAN to promulgate their views on 
non-interference by external powers and to use ASEAN "solidarity" to back up this 
position. According to Palmer, as far back as the 1970s, "some of the Pacific 
countries with special ties and interests in Southeast Asia expressed an interest in 
periodic consultations with ASEAN."106 These overtures were not pursued at the time 
due to fears of external intervention and domination by the more powerful nations of the 
Asia-Pacific region and the weakness of the ASEAN association. With another two 
decades of experience, the end of the Cold War has given rise to a resurgence of interest 
in dialogue between ASEAN and the rest of the Asia-Pacific. This interest comes from 
within and from outside of ASEAN. 
Economic cooperation in Southeast Asia has been evolving on three levels: 
global, regional, and sub-regional. Formal initiatives on these three levels are the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
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While an ongoing initiative towards global trade liberalization and not an Asian 
initiative, GATT still provides the framework within which regional organizations are 
formed. The most recent, Uruguay Round of negotiations went into force in 1994 and 
resulted in a 40 percent reduction in the tariffs developed countries place on industrial 
products (excluding petroleum) from a trade weighted average of 6.3 to 3.8 percent.107 
One of the most significant accomplishments of the Uruguay Round was the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition to establishing a 
permanent General Council to oversee operations between biannual meetings of a 
Ministerial Conference, this Council will act as a Dispute Settlement Body tasked with 
administering the WTO's dispute settlement procedures. 
The Conference on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) first met in 
Canberra in November 1989. This conference was proposed by former Australian Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke as a comprehensive, official, all Asia-Pacific mechanism for 
economic cooperation. It was convened to provide a forum for dialogue on the 
interdependence of economic prosperity and political stability in the Asia-Pacific region. 
After some hesitation, the ASEAN countries agreed to send representatives, and the 
conference now includes the ASEAN members as well as Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, 
Japan, New Zealand, the PRC, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States.108   It was 
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agreed from the beginning that APEC would focus on the economic themes of sustained 
growth and development in the region and non-discriminatory trade liberalization and not 
on political or security issues. 
Annual ministerial meetings have been held since 1989. The fourth such 
meeting, held in Bangkok in 1992 set up a permanent APEC Secretariat to be located in 
Singapore and established the Eminent Persons Group (EPG). In 1993, in Seattle, an 
informal leaders meeting was proposed and hosted by President Clinton. This format was 
repeated at the APEC meeting held in Bogor, Indonesia in November 1994. While APEC 
has concentrated on economic issues, this elevation to the summit level will insure that it 
will take on more regional security issues. For an organization that began as little more 
than a forum for discussion, it has taken on the trappings of a formal institution: a 
Secretariat, standing committees, and annual ministerial and leaders meetings. 
The 1994 APEC meeting also produced the Declaration of Common Resolve. 
This declaration stated that the members are to use APEC to continue the work begun by 
GATT towards an open multilateral trading system and not an inward looking trading 
bloc. It also made the commitment to achieve "free and open trade" in the Asia-Pacific 
no later than 2020. Allowing for differences in development, industrialized members 
would be required to meet this goal by 2010 with developing members by 2020. 
In December 1990, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed an alternative to 
APEC, the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG). His desire was to promote a more 
Asian sense of regional community by the exclusion of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
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and the United States. In October 1992, he stepped up his campaign for such an 
organization, now called the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), during a visit to 
Tokyo by arguing "that APEC was an economic and political tool of the United 
States."109 Mahathir desired the EAEC to counter what he saw as insular trade blocs 
developing elsewhere. This debate, while not dead, has been muted by the inclusion of 
the EAEC as a standing committee within APEC. 
Changes in the economic environment since then has made AFTA the "right idea 
at the right time" when proposed by Thailand in 1991. These changes include the growth 
of regional trading blocs such as NAFTA and the EU. Though non-discriminatory to 
non-members, these blocs increase trade and investment preferences to members and as a 
result increase intra-regional trade at the expense of non-members. Add to this new 
competition from the emerging economies of China and Vietnam. These are seen a 
threat to the ASEAN share of markets and investment capitol. 
Along with these threats, the ASEAN members recognize their weakness in acting 
along in extra-regional relationships. In spite of regional competition, they recognize it is 
in their best interest to come together and speak as one voice. This new economic voice 
being AFTA. The AFTA concept was first endorsed at the fourth ASEAN summit in 
January 1992 with the goal of lowering import tariffs on most manufactured goods within 
15 years. In contrast with NAFTA which describes in detail how its provisions will be 
carried out, AFTA began as little more than an agreement in principle with the details to 
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be worked out later. It was stated that it was more important to achieve consensus on the 
goal then to hammer out the specific details. The timetable to reach this goal of reducing 
import tariffs for members to below 5 percent and to extend the tariff cuts to cover 
unprocessed agriculture was shorted by five years (to January 2003) in response to the 
latest APEC initiatives. This decision was endorsed by the ASEAN Economic Ministers 
in September 1994. Most of the details have been worked out and harmonization of tariff 
nomenclature, customs procedures, and customs valuations should be completed by the 
end of 1995.no 
It should be noted that AFTA members are extremely outward looking; 
intra-ASEAN trade accounts for less that 20 percent of their total trade. 
The major expected benefit of AFTA is to enhance the competitiveness of 
the region for production geared towards the global market through tariff 
reductions and elimination of non-tariff barriers. In other words, the goal 
of AFTA is to generate greater efficiency and effectiveness of business 
transactions in the region rather that to create an inward-looking trading 
bloc.111 
Another initiative has been the recent development of regional "growth areas" in 
Southeast Asia to stimulate investment and growth in underdeveloped areas.  One such 
area in the formation of an East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA), a so-called "growth 
quadrangle" linking Brunei with the largely neglected outer island provinces of 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.112    A second "growth triangle" has been 
formed between Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
Since the end of the Cold-War, there have been many proposals for multilateral 
organizations that would promote a defense or security dialogue. In July 1990, Canadian 
foreign minister Joe Clark proposed a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue "to 
pursue cooperative security by rectifying uneven economic development, preventing 
trade disputes and environmental degradation, and establishing sectors of interaction in 
non-traditional and multilateral security venues."113 Later that same month, Australian 
foreign minister, Gareth Evans expanded this idea in calling for a more broad based 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) modeled after the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). 
Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaadmadja, in September 1990, 
proposed the Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia Defense Agreement (MASINDO) as a 
replacement for the FPDA. Indonesia envisions a defense pact between the Malacca 
Straits powers to safeguard ASEAN maritime interests. In April 1992, Australian prime 
minister Paul Keating proposed a Heads of Government Summit of APEC members as a 
means of integrating a regional security dialogue into the APEC structure. In May 1992, 
Malaysia proposed a regional Security Dialogue that would have included APEC 
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members to provide a forum for dialogue between senior defense officials on regional 
security issues. These proposals continue the dialogue and provide a pattern of progress 
towards greater multilateral security dialogue and cooperation. 
ASEAN as a regional organization is well on the way to full Southeast Asian 
membership. With the addition of the newly independent state of Brunei in 1984, six of 
the ten Southeast Asian nations are members. Where Vietnam was once the primary 
threat to ASEAN, at the Manila ASEAN-AMM in 1992 both Vietnam and Laos have 
signed the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a first step to full membership and 
were given observer status to allow them to attend future ASEAN-AMMs. This treaty 
includes the commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict and to functional, especially 
economic cooperation. This leaves Cambodia and Burma, both with significant progress 
required before membership can be considered. 
Following the 1977 summit in Kuala Lumpur, at the annual ASEAN post- 
ministerial conference (ASEAN-PMC), the first informal meetings of the foreign 
ministers of ASEAN members and interested parties, now formally known as the 
"dialogue partners" began. Over the years, these meetings have allowed the opportunity 
for discussion with outside powers on a wide range of issues. These issues have been 
predominately economic, but common concerns revolving around developments in 
Indochina such as the flow of refugees have also been discussed. "By the mid-1980s, it 
had developed into a de facto security dialogue regarding Indochina's future and 
regarding the creation of an acceptable structure of peace balancing great power strategic 
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involvement in Southeast Asia."114 Beginning in 1992, this conference agreed for the 
first time to add security issues to their agenda and now includes the foreign ministers of 
the six ASEAN members, formal dialogue partners consisting of Australia, the European 
Community, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States, and two 
observers: Laos and Vietnam. 
At the 1993 ASEAN-AMM in Singapore, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was 
created and met for the first time in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. This forum provides for a 
security dialogue among ASEAN members, the dialogue partners, three observers(now 
including Papua New Guinea), and two guests: Russia and the PRC. Where in the past 
ASEAN has responded to crisis in an ad hoc manor, this forum is a first step towards a 
regional security organization. 
This first meeting of the ARF scheduled between the ASEAN-AMM and PMCs 
lasted for only three hours but agreed to the following provisions: 
• The meeting will be convened on an annual basis and the second meeting will 
be held in Brunei in 1995. 
• The subjects which ARF may study in the future include confidence and 
security building, nuclear non-proliferation, PKO (Peacekeeping Operations), 
- exchanges of non-classified military information, maritime security issues, 
preventive diplomacy and the comprehensive concept of security. 
• ARF endorsed the purposes and principles of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 1976, as a code of conduct governing 
relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional 
confidence building, preventive diplomacy and political security cooperation. 
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. The meeting will promote the eventual participation of all ARF countries in 
the UN Conventional Arms Register. 
• Of most importance at the meeting was that members expressed firm 
conviction to continue to work towards the strengthening and enhancement of 
political and security cooperation within the region as a means of ensuring 
lasting peace, stability and prosperity for the region and its peoples.115 
Despite the fact that the ARF was an indigenous ASEAN proposal, it is not 
entirely clear that ASEAN favors an Asia-Pacific-wide approach over its more traditional 
regional ones.116 The major rationale behind the proposal of the ARF has been the desire 
of the ASEAN nations to control the development of this Asia-Pacific security process, 
not to be "subsumed within a wider Asia-Pacific framework as the dialogue process is 
expanded, especially if the major powers take the lead."117 This is the same rationale 
behind the Malaysian economic proposal for a more Asian organization than APEC. 
According to Jusuf Wanandi, chairman of the supervisory board of the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, "confidence-building and transparency is 
part of ASEAN's four-pronged approach to regional security."118 This approach consists 
of increasing security cooperation within ASEAN, preparing other Southeast Asian 
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countries for membership, continued relations with the great powers, and by increasing 
ASEAN and United Nation's efforts at cooperative security or peacekeeping. 
Within Southeast Asia there are still historical disputes such as those between 
Indonesia and Malaysia or the Philippines and Malaysia over the status of Sabah. With 
the expanded rights of coastal states as a result of the Third UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS HI), the South China Sea is considered a semi-enclosed sea, often 
referred to as a geographical lake. It is bordered by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the 
Philippines with the PRC and Taiwan to the north. Not only do all these nations have 
conflicting historical claims to this area, but there are numerous new disputes resulting 
from overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). These disputes have already 
resulted in the use of military force as occurred between Vietnam and the PRC on March 
14, 1988, but also to the threat of force which works to undermine efforts toward 
peaceful resolution. 
In addition, there are disputes over the flow of refugees, labor, illegal immigrants, 
smuggling, drug trafficking, poaching, piracy, and navigational safety among others that 
need to be resolved and are best discussed in a multilateral framework. 
Although attempts at Southeast Asian regionalism have been abortive, limited, 
and primarily externally initiated, ASEAN, an indigenous organization, has enjoyed a 
modicum of success. Formed primarily in response to security concerns, it has until 
recently focused on economic cooperation. Since the end of the Cold-War new initiatives 
towards further integration and advancement of security concerns such as the ARF have 
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been proposed, while at the same time problems such as the multinational dispute over 
the South China Sea and overlapping EEZs have come up to stress the capability of the 
organization to resolve disputes and prevent conflict. The agenda for the 1995 ARF 
meeting is limited to confidence building measures, peace keeping efforts, and 
preventive diplomacy. The absence of dialogue on national interests severely inhibits 
any genuine progress. It is yet to be seen if this can be overcome to form an effective, 
fully integrated, regional association capable of not only preventing conflict but also 
resolving disputes. 
With the end of the Cold-War has come the loss of the obvious East/West threat 
taking with it much of the superpower presence in the region and subsequently has 
increased the uncertainty and insecurity of Southeast Asian states at a time when 
economic success has provided many of them with the means to provide for an increased 
share of their own security. This increased economic, political, and military power could 
be a source of or a threat to regional security. 
In responding to the very real need of coastal nations, with newly expanded 
resource and mineral rights as well as existing maritime security requirements such as the 
prevention of piracy, smuggling, safety of navigation, and the environment, to modernize 
in an uncertain post Cold-War security environment, it is clear that Southeast Asian 
nations experience great difficulty in trying to move beyond unilateral or traditional 
Southeast Asian bilateral action. 
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Therefore, despite much effort towards regional security cooperation, ASEAN is 
not likely to become a collective security organization.   This is true for the following 
reasons: 
The absence of a common threat(s) to the ASEAN-six; 
The need to resolve conflicts arising from overlapping EEZs in the South 
China Sea; 
The lack of interoperability among ASEAN armed forces and differing 
military doctrines and orientations; for example, between Singapore's forward 
defence out into the South China Sea and Indonesia's defence in depth; 
Continued reluctance to expand bilateral to multilateral exercises despite the 
advantages of the latter. Thus, although trilateral exercises among Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore could create an effective Straits-of-Malacca control 
arrangement, they have not occurred. Nor have similar arrangements among 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia for the Andaman Sea approach to the 
western entrance of the Malacca; 
Individual ASEAN members prefer to rely on outside powers to augment their 
own security efforts - Malaysia and Singapore on Great Britain, Australia, and 
New Zealand through the Five-Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA); and 
Thailand and the Philippines on the United States through the Manila Pact 
and a mutual defense treaty.119 
Concentration on bilateral instead of multilateral relationships both intra- 
regionally and with external powers on substantive issues. 
The limited membership of ASEAN since only six of Southeast Asia's states 
are members and while steps are being taken to bring the remaining four into 
the association, economic and political turmoil and different levels of 
development will make full integration at least as difficult as that of 
incorporating Eastern Europe into the European Union. 
119 Sheldon W. Simon, "U.S. Strategy and Southeast Asian Security: Issues of Compatibility,' 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 4 ( March 1993), 310. 
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All in all, therefore, 
ASEAN seems to have established itself as a comprehensive regional 
organization that is growing in strength and in support from its members, 
its "dialogue partners," and many other countries, and that is beginning to 
function as a collective entity on the international stage. It is becoming, in 
short, an important international as well as regional and interregional 
actor,120 
but it still has a long way to go. 
120
 Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia And the Pacific. 74. 
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VI. U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY: TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 
According to W.Y. Smith, writing on the eve of the Persian Gulf War, past U.S. 
policy is a useful guide to future U.S. strategic thinking, but it is not sufficient to predict 
future U.S. policy.  He projects three patterns likely to influence U.S. national security 
policy in the future: 
. The United States will be less willing and less able to take unilateral military 
action than it has in the past; 
• The U.S. Congress will insist on a more influential role in decisions 
concerning war and peace; and 
• Divergent perceptions of national interests in a world with fewer constraints 
on actions by national governments will encourage individualism that will 
threaten historic friendships and alliances.m 
As absolute and relative U.S. power declines in the future, and it will be most 
apparent in the Asia-Pacific region, the costs of intervention increase.    While it is 
important that the United States should maintain the capability to act unilaterally to 
protect vital national interests, it is clear that this will take on ever increasing costs and 
may not always be possible. The increased cost of acting alone has strengthened the call 
for increased burden-sharing in crisis operations, UN peace operations, and general 
deterrence. 
121
 W.Y. Smith, "Principles of U.S. Grand Strategy: Past and Future," The Washington Quarterly 
14, no. 2 (Spring 1991), 76-77. 
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Congress, for its part, has taken an assertive, proactive role in U.S. foreign policy 
and this trend along with fostering public support is increasing. In this regard, the 
President must make a greater effort to convince the American people of the importance 
of Asia to the United States and the need to remain engaged to justify the other elements 
of policy such as treaty obligations and forward presence. 
The international system has always been anarchic.    While there have been 
attempts to establish a supranational body to enforce order, and in spite of the euphoria at 
the end of the Cold War and the proclamation of a "new world order," one does not exist. 
Nationalism is stronger today than ever before and sovereignty is the battle cry. During 
the Cold War, there existed a relatively stable, bi-polar international system which 
divided the World into roughly two camps, the Communist camp led by the Soviet Union 
and the West, led by the United States.  These two camps and their superpower leader 
constrained the actions of those states which fell into their "spheres of influence." In the 
future, without this stable bipolar system and its "spheres of influence," all countries are 
again free to act in their own self interests. These interests may not necessarily be those 
of the United States. This freedom to act independently of U.S. foreign policy is causing 
a great deal of friction in the Asia-Pacific not only between the United States and Japan, 
which desires a leadership role commensurate with their economic position, but also 
between Japan and the emerging superpower, China. 
U.S. national interests are fundamental and enduring, but they are easily confused 
with national objectives. The national interests can be reduced to the enduring concepts 
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of security, trade, and access. Democratization and respect for human rights, the recently 
added interests embodied in enlargement, are noble objectives but are not fundamental 
interests. They will always take second place to the survival of the United States. In 
peacetime, with our security intact, greater emphasis may be placed on realizing these 
objectives but their place in the hierarchy of interests and objectives should be clearly 
understood because of their importance in the making of policy. 
In the Asia-Pacific, U.S. national interests are seen more clearly and U.S. 
commitment to the region must be couched in terms of these fundamental interests to be 
credible. The nations of the region understand that they cannot base their survival on 
U.S. commitment to democracy in the same way they had with the U.S. commitment to 
containment during the Cold War. 
Southeast Asia is a diverse region of enduring conflicts and that the end of the 
Cold War has brought with it the most profound peace the region has known since World 
War II, but also uncertainty. New conflicts have been joined due to changes in the law of 
the sea, the globalization of trade, markets, and investment, and the search for resources 
to fuel continued growth. Stability and prosperity have brought with them increased 
competition at the same time that previously isolated economies are opening to the global 
market and placing a strain on the world-wide resource of capital. 
Southeast Asia is a region of promise, a region of stability, growth, and relative 
prosperity, but it contains two primary troublespots: Burma, with a repressive 
government and a closed economy is falling further behind the rest of the region in 
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economic growth as well as political and social liberalization; and Indochina, which after 
decades of conflict is making an attempt at the liberalization of markets but is starting far 
behind the ASEAN members. Full integration into the region is still many years away. 
Regional prosperity and growth have been and still are linked to regional stability 
and security which provide an environment which allows those in the region to focus on 
growth and development without having to spend a disproportionate amount of their 
national treasure on maintaining that stability. This secure environment has been 
underwritten as a "public good" by a Western, primarily U.S. led, Cold War alliance 
system. With the end of the Cold War, the raison d'etre for this threat based system has 
dissolved, but the importance of continued peace and stability remain. 
To neo-isolationists in the United States, the loss of this threat driven strategy in 
Asia would justify a complete withdrawal from the region, but the world is still a 
dangerous and uncertain place and U.S. economic interests are engaged abroad as never 
before. The United States must remain engaged for both security and economic reasons. 
To enhance security, the United States needs to play a leadership role to shape the 
developing post-Cold War system to its favor. The United States is also in the unique 
position of being, while not wholly trusted, the "honest broker" in regional affairs. In the 
play for influence, Japan desires U.S. support to maintain security in Northeast Asia and 
to balance against a resurgent China and China desires U.S. presence, in the context of 
the present U.S.-Japan relationship, as a means of controlling Japanese influence. 
ASEAN not only wants to see a favorable balance of power develop in Northeast Asia, 
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but also desires continued U.S. presence in Southeast Asia to "guarantee" the stability 
that has developed. This stability not only promotes trade but also reduces the expense 
of each providing for their own defense, both of which are vital to continued growth. 
In Southeast Asia, ASEAN, after almost 30 years is still an organization of both 
profound strength and weakness. Originally formed in response to security threats within 
the region it acted throughout most of the Cold War primarily as a forum for dialogue on 
economic issues and not one dispute has been resolved in this forum. With this said, 
however, ASEAN today is seen as a success, even a model for regional organizations 
worldwide. The reason for this apparent paradox is that intra-regional disputes, while 
resolved strictly on a bilateral basis even today, have not been allowed to breakup an 
organization that all have found to be useful in support of their interests at one time or 
another. In this way the organization survives and maintains a contact between states 
that may otherwise have been isolated. This has worked to lower tensions in general and 
norms of behavior have been established. The primary regional objectives of ASEAN 
have always been: 
• Internal Stability; The stability of each member is essential to regional peace 
- and security so that each member contributes to regional peace by eliminating 
threats or subversion at home. 
• Self-Reliance; The Indonesian concept of "national resilience" or that a state 
should not depend on an external power to protect their security. From this 
flowed the desire for a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom, and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN), a largely defunct, Cold-War objective. 
• Prosperity; To promote economic and social development to increase the 
standard of living of all people. This has taken on the multilateral dimension 
of AFT A within the region and participation in APEC. 
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. Sovereignty and Conflict Resolution; The fundamental norms of non- 
interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. These norms have been formalized in the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation that has been signed by all ASEAN members. 
In security cooperation, however, ASEAN has been less than a success. 
Traditionally, ASEAN has not been in a position to take on major security issues. The 
closest ASEAN has come to responding to a common threat was in response to the 
Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia during the third Indochina conflict. This response, 
however, clearly reflected not only ASEAN's weakness but strength. Weakness in its 
impotence to take any meaningful military response and strength in its ability to form a 
unified political and diplomatic response and to hold it together for the duration of the 
conflict. This response took the form of continued pressure on the UN to act. 
The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia had violated two fundamental norms 
of interstate relations: non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and 
conflict resolution by peaceful means. The ASEAN members responding to the land 
based threat to Thailand by Vietnam took their case to the UN. This resulted in the July 
1981 declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) that called for the 
complete-withdrawal of all foreign force from Cambodia and emphasized the right of 
self-determination of people. A decade later, the Paris arguments of October 1991 set the 
stage for these goals to be carried out under the auspices of the newly formed UNTAC. 
In Southeast Asia this is seen as a successful multilateral solution that would not have 
resulted without the combined strength of a common voice through ASEAN in the UN. 
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Where does current U.S. national security strategy play in the development of 
Southeast Asia? The strategy of engagement, the security component of this strategy, 
promotes stability and thus prosperity which are vital not only to the United States but 
every country in the region. It is in the second component, enlargement where the 
interests of the United States and Asia diverge. 
Enlargement is itself composed of the two related concepts of self-determination 
and human rights. The United States believes that these are not only national values but 
fundamental rights of man while most of Asia argues that these are culturally determined 
and are not universal. Herein lies the dilemma. It was argued in Chapter II that these are 
values and not interests and as such should not be the criteria by which to develop and 
judge national strategy. The United States must develop its own values and belief 
systems as any nation must, and it is appropriate to promote those beliefs abroad but the 
nation should not sacrifice higher priority interests of security and prosperity in the 
process. 
In the Asia-Pacific in general and Southeast Asia specifically, there is a trend 
away from authoritarian regimes towards more "democratic" forms of government which 
has paralleled national and economic development and prosperity. There is no reason to 
expect that this will not continue. With this development has come power, both in the 
military sense as well as political and economic. This increase in relative power relative 
to the United States will also continue. For the United States to retain its leadership role 
and influence in the region, there must be more of a dialogue based on equality and 
partnership and less based on the "enlargement" of any particular system of values as 
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percieved by the Americans. Resolution of conflict in Southeast Asia, as everywhere else 
in the world, is of far more benefit to mankind when it is based on diplomacy and 
compromise between equals rather than upon the threat or use of force. 
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